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PREFACE 
Development geography has traditionally concerned 
itself with describing regional economic disparities in a 
country and seeking normative remedies for the problem of 
uneven •development*. Rarely was the problem perceived of 
as an historical process, or as a process which transcends 
national limits, or as an outcome of ideologically-based 
strategies. That is, development geographers ignored the 
structures of which underdevelopment is but a part. A 
departure from this orthodox type of approach is made here. 
As an exercise in renovated development geography, 
this dissertation is by definition historico-political in 
nature. The notion of development may be equated, essen-
tially, with progress toward a set of goals inherent in 
the ideology1 of a group or class of people. Oversimpli-
fied as this definition may be, it does help to explain 
why the development of the nation - national development -
is often an arduous process whereby conflicting sub-nation-
al social groups pursue varying means toward different 
Utopias. History is replete with the consequences of 
ideologically-based conflicts, and South Africa has not 
been spared. In that country, the search for happiness 
and security by a politically and economically dominant 
group has been unsuccessful, for that search has been at 
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the cost of unhappiness and insecurity among those excluded 
from the superordinate group. This study is concerned with 
aspects of the spatial impress of polity and economy in 
South Africa; or, put another way, it is concerned with the 
spatial expression of ideologies of the dominant group. 
South Africa's population is categorised by its 
rulers into a number of groups on the basis of racial or 
ethnic differentiation. The economically and politically 
dominant group comprises whites (4.l6million in number in 
1974 ), and it is at the hand of members of this group that 
segregation according to this categorisation is enforced. 
The numerically dominant group (numbering 17.75million in 
1974) is composed of Africans (blacks), exclusive of Col-
oureds (2.31million in 1974), Indians (0.71million in 1974), 
and other numerically less significant groups. 
Africans, or blacks, are, in the dissertation, con-
ceived of as constituting an internal colony within South 
Africa. Members of the African group, who are synonymously 
referred to as blacks in the dissertation, have been des-
ignated in the past as Natives and, in the nomenclature of 
today's rulers, as Bantu. Similarly, the locations and 
reserves of yesteryear, to which blacks have been relegated 
to varying degrees and under changing conditions, have 
undergone transformation in official notation. The terms 
location and reserve have been replaced by the term 'home-
IX 
land'3. The latter concept complies with the development 
of apartheid^", the ideology and practice of post-1943 seg-
regation under the direction of the ruling National Party. 
In this study the terms Native, Bantu, and location are 
used only when contained in an official title (e.g. the 
name of a government department), or in quoted passages. 
KwaZulu is the name attached to a complex of form-
er r^erves now constituting a 'homeland* which is situated 
jr> the South African province of Natal (see Map No. 1). 
Besides introducing the objectives of the study 
and the research approach adopted, Chapter One also briefly 
sets KwaZulu in historical and spatial perspective. There-
after, Chapter Two elaborates on the conceptual framework 
for the dissertation (i.e. internal colonialism) and 
attempts to illustrate the comparative applicability of 
different models for analysing the South African economy 
<md society in their spatial and temporal dimensicnr. 
The third chapter returns to KwaZulu and attempts an 
analysis of KwaZulu*s historical origins up to 1972. 
Whereas Chanter Three represents an outline of developments 
over more than one hundred years, the analysis is more 
detailed in Chapter Four where attention is concentrated 
on the years 1972 to 1975. It has besn these years during 
which government has announced its partial consolidation 
plans for FwaZulu. Chapter Five specifies selected major 
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implications of the government*s consolidation proposals. 
Finally, Chapter Six endeavours, as a synthesis of the 
study, to formulate some important questions about the 
future of development and underdevelopment in the Republic 
of South Africa. A number of maps, including one showing 
a selection of place names in Natal, are appended to 
the text and may interest the reader unfamiliar with 
Natal (Appendix A), 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The objectives and scope of the research project 
are defined in this chapter (1.2). A section briefing the 
historical geographical base of KwaZulu follows (1.3). 
Finally, the data sources and methods for the research are 
outlined (1.4) and the research intentions summarised (1.5). 
1.2 Objectives and Scope 
Despite the implementation of apartheid being fun-
damentally a spatial exercise, its implications have rec-
eived limited attention in geographical literature(Smith, 
1976), and there is a dearth of geographical work on the 
role of the state and of capital in moulding the South Afri-
can space economy through its evolution. Remarkable too 
is the apparent disregard in the geographical literature 
for theories of colonialism and underdevelopment, currently 
applied in other social sciences, which might assist the 
geographer to comprehend the contemporary spatial pattern 
in South Africa, particularly in terms of its genesis. 
The problem at hand, therefore, is a manifold one 
of conceptualisation and of establishing the empirical 
association between discernable economic and social forces 
in South Africa and the territorial makeup of KwaZulu. 
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The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the 
creation and manipulation of the territorial base of Kwa-
Zulu, with primary focus upon recent attempts by South 
Africa*s government partially to consolidate KwaZulu into 
ten non-contiguous segments. This action is explored with 
special attention being paid to the manner in which Kwa-
Zulu was arranged as a response to white economic and pol-
itical interests and aspirations; to the part played by 
blacks in the establishment and sanctioning of the partial 
consolidation schemes; and, to the way in which the schemes 
promote or hinder peaceful change toward a system wherein 
the fruits of South Africa*s labour and material resources 
are equitably distributed. 
Conceptual foundations for the study originate 
from theories of colonialism and development and under-
development, and are assembled and presented within the 
internal colonialism model (discussed in detail in Chapter 
Two). 
1-3 KwaZulu in Brief 
The territorially dismembered KwaZulu 'homeland* 
is encapsulated by Natal (see Map No.2). Natal Province 
was administered as a colony by Britain 1345 until 1910 
(Zululand was annexed to Natal in 1397), when it became 
one of the four provinces in the Union of South Africa . 
Under British colonial administration and during the rule 
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of Union government various legislative acts laid the foun-
dations for a system of reserving land for exclusive settle-
ment by indigenous blacks within Natal and facilitated the 
territorial fragmentation of Zululand (see 3.3). 
After 1943, when the current regime came to power, 
an ideology of apartheid (later termed *separate develop-
ment* by proponents of the ideology) moved government to 
work toward maintaining the system of reserves with a view 
eventually to giving these areas political independence 
from South Africa. Government clustered the original 
reserves in South Africa into ten fragmented complexes, 
which it called 'homelands*, and allocated them to various 
tribal groupings (or *national units*) in the country. 
The end result of apartheid policy, then, would be a *white* 
South Africa containing a number of politically independent 
*black* states, of which a dissected KwaZulu would be one. 
Success thus far, from the apartheid perspective, may be 
measured in Transkei*s attainment of political independence 
on 26 October, 1976 and indications that another 'home-
land*, Bophuthatswana, will acquire that status in December, 
1977. 
At present, KwaZulu consists of forty eight blocks 
of land and over one hundred smaller tracts ('black spots* ), 
amounting to 3,155,OOOha and carrying in 1970 a de facto/ 
population of approximately 4,0l3,000(Maasdorp, 1974). 
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Official policy would have it that all six million people 
classified by government as Zulu ultimately become citizens 
of an independent state of KwaZulu. 
Government has, during the last four years, proposed 
plans to consolidate KwaZulu into ten segments. Such action 
demands large-scale resettlement of blacks, mostly from one 
rural area to another, and the granting of fiscal compen-
sations to the relatively few whites whose land is delimit-
ed now as KwaZulu territory, and who are expected to migrate 
to *white* territory. 
While Black response to the implementation of apart-
heid has not been insignificant, government has proceeded 
apace in pursuance of its segregationist goals. Reaction 
from blacks has come as outright refusals to co-operate 
with the white government, in the form of violence; it has 
come in the form of worker strikes against conditions symp-
tomatic of a discriminatory labour policy; and it has come 
in a form legitimised* by government, from those operating 
the government-designed KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. 
Black politicians are utilising the consolidation issue to 
parry government's attempts to give KwaZulu political inde-
pendence, and their approach as well as the other voices 
of black opposition command some attention in the disser-
tation. 
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1.4 Data and Methodology 
The data analysed in this study are largely empiric-
al or empirically-based and were collected from primary and 
secondary sources in South Africa. Although most of the 
information was gathered during research in various lib-
raries in Natal^ , information was also sought by corres-
pondence with relevant officials and other individuals and 
organisations. 
Primary material comprising descriptive and quanti-
tative data was found In colonial and post-colonial Blue 
Books on Native Affairs, in census and other official stat-
istical reports, and in Hansard reports on Parliamentary 
proceedings. Primary material reflecting official attitudes 
was derived from Hansard and from reports of officials to 
government, either in the form found in Blue Books or such 
as is found in official correspondence and in the reports 
of government-initiated commissions of inquiry. The latter 
reports contain also evidence submitted by witnesses to the 
commissions. 
Secondary sources, including both published works 
and unpublished theses, provided much in the way of quanti-
tative data, as well as assisting in the framing of the 
historical perspective of the dissertation. 
Information pertaining to the post-1970 consolida-
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tion issue and other recent developments originates mainly 
from Natalian press reports, other pertinent documents 
(especially critiques of the consolidation proposals), and 
personal observation. 
Hatal in its economic, social, political, and ter-
ritorial dimensions is the structure, the composition of 
which is of interest here. Stating parameters as such is 
not to deny that the components mentioned belong also to 
a larger structure, the South African political-space econ-
omy, say; or that that larger structure is nested within 
other structures of economy and society, of development 
and underdevelopment, and so on. An exposition of the 
relationships within and among these structures is later 
seen to be fundamental to an explanation of international 
patterns of development and underdevelopment. 
The relationships under scrutiny in the ensuing 
chapters are those between white owners of land (i.e. capital) 
and the state, between those landowners and the land, and 
between black occupants of the land and each of the other 
three elements. 
Depth is sought in the level of reality exemplified 
by ideology. Ideology is taken to mean the body of ideas 
commonly shared by a social group or social class, and 
whereby group or class interests are rationalised. Insight 
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into the ideologies of landowners, of government, and of 
blacks, respectively, is vital to an understanding of the 
dynamics of the South African space economy, for these 
ideologies represent bonds of cohesion and motivation for 
group action. 
1.5 Summary of Intentions 
This study: 
1)Examines the roles of government, white landowners, and 
blacks in creating, delimiting, and altering KwaZulu 
over time. 
2)Outlines government's partial consolidation proposals 
for KwaZulu and analyses the roles of the abovementioned 
actors in formulating, defending, and opposing these 
proposals. 
3)Posits some potential major problems arising from the 
consolidation proposals. 
4)0ffers, through synthesis, a contribution toward the 
development of the geography of development and under-
development, particularly as it relates to South Africa. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE 
2.1 Introduction 
An analytical framework for the dissertation is 
erected in this chapter. Firstly, the bearing of ideology 
on the geography of development is discussed (2.2). There-
after, the concepts of development, underdevelopment, col-
onialism, and dependence are considered (2.3) and this 
provides a springboard for the building of a model of in-
ternal colonialism through extrapolation from these concepts 
and from the work of Hechter(1975) (2.4). The model is 
contrasted with others (2.5), and a summary statement of 
its applicability to South African socio-economic structures 
is presented (2.6). 
2.2 Ideology and Development Geography 
A growing awareness of the negative repercussions 
of development and the impress of historical factors in 
underdeveloped regions has been accompanied by an abundance 
of publications reflecting changing theoretical and analyt-
ical tendencies in the social sciences. Within geography, 
the last five years have seen the emergence and growth of 
a school of thought founded during the 'social relevance' 
era of the early seventies and having now as frames of 
reference generally socialistic texts, often with a Marxist 
or neo-Marxist bent. 
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As noted by Santos(1974), a reliance on Marx is not 
a novelty in broader geographic traditions. However, the 
trend noted is certainly an innovation among Anglophone 
geographers. Santos(1974) also calls attention to the 
degree to which Marx provides a pertinent source for geog-
raphers, especially those concerned with underdevelopment. 
Following Santos'(1974) line of questioning, discussion in 
this section revolves around the contents of selected recent 
publications and seeks to clarify the relationships between 
ideology and analytical concepts in geographical studies of 
development and underdevelopment. 
A number of geographers have been striving, since 
about 1973, to inform their confreres about the presence 
of ideologies which shape geographic research methodologies. 
They have suggested, furthermore, that geographers should 
change their ideological stances since the results of their 
research perpetuates the status QUO: a societal condition 
(viz. capitalism) not conducive, it is argued, to social 
equity or egalitarianism. Examples of such ideas are found 
in articles by Anderson(1973), Slater(1973), Blaut(1974), 
Harvey(1974), and Olsson(1974). Blaut(1974) makes the 
point that while the values of many geographers in capital-
ist countries are rooted in an agreeable conception of the 
need for change to achieve social justice, their method-
ologies and thus research results are inappropriate contri-
butions toward this goal. Attention may also be drawn to 
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the fact that much research is constrained by the Elites of 
society who, directly or indirectly, finance and utilise 
social research and its results. 
Ideological transformations have altered the direc-
tion of development geography, and the changing emphasis 
within this branch of the discipline is considered firstly 
by reference to a critique of orthodox development geog-
raphy by Slater(1973)• The contributions of de Souza and 
Porter(1974), Brookfield(1975), and Santos(1974;1975) are 
then introduced as representatives of the van in a changing 
paradigm for development geography. 
Slater(1973) cogently illustrates the weaknesses 
inherent in the three modes of analysis widely applied by 
development geographers. He links the three modes - spatial 
differentiation (duality and centre-periphery models); 
spatial diffusion (modernization theory); and spatial inte-
gration (models of national integration) - to a distinct 
ideology and argues that the ideology must be changed if 
sound theories of development and underdevelopment are to 
be established. Slater(1973) posits the opinion that the 
weak theoretical base of orthodox development geography 
may be traced to '...the capitalist ideology that 
conditions the choice of the problem, the 
type of data collected, the method of analy-
sis employed, and the identification of con-
clusions for planning' (Slater,1973). The remedy for 
this crisis, he maintains, is '...not just a 
reformist readjustment of some of the most 
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distorted tenets of capitalist ideology, but 
a total abolition of the ideology itself and 
the development of a Marxist-orientated geog-
raphy, which...goes to the historical roots 
of underdevelopment as manifested at all spa-
tial levels, incorporating explanations of 
internal spatial structures of underdevelop-
ment into the framework of the political 
economy of imperialism' (Slater,1973). 
The views expressed by Slater(1973) are relatively 
new in the geographical literature but reflect ideas ex-
pounded for some years in other social sciences. Frank 
(1967;1969;1972), for example, has dealt with underdevelop-
ment as a process concomitant with colonialism and capital-
ism. His works have been widely read and have received not 
a little criticism from economists and sociologists (see, 
e.g., the critiques in Oxaal,Barnett,and Booth,1975). 
Emmanuel(1972) also has recently supplemented his treatise 
on the distribution of capital and the unequal exchange of 
capital with labour on a global scale. In a recent article 
he reiterates the necessity of studying underdevelopment as 
a phenomenon related with development in other parts of the 
world, i.e. underdevelopment is seen to be a function of 
the development of international capitalism (Emmanuel,1974). 
de Souza and Porter(1974) propound a dialectical 
geography and cite Harvey(1973) as the protagonist of this 
approach in geography. While their book has some appeal 
as a review of an extensive range of literature on develop-
ment, underdevelopment, and modernization, the authors fail 
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to distinguish clearly between modernization and develop-
ment (a common failing among orthodox geographers). An 
early contribution to a changing paradigm in geography, the 
work is, as stated in its preface, only a 'starting point', 
and provides, as such, little insight into the current state 
of development geography. 
Brookfield(1975), after a more thorough and more 
extensive review of geographical and non-geographical lit-
erature than de Souza and Porter(1974), profers the found-
ations for a theory of interdependent development. While 
accepting socialistic conceptions of imperialism, colonial-
ism, and capitalism, and dubbing himself a neo-Marxist, 
Brookfield(1975) proceeds to state his disenchantment with 
the prospect of a purely Marxist geography. Besides his 
rejection of the authority of Marx, Brookfield(1975) also 
demonstrates non-acceptance of the Marxist image of class 
struggle. For his treatment of the notion of dependence, 
his work will be of interest to development geographers, 
although this does not necessarily imply their acceptance 
of his interpretation of global patterns of development 
and underdevelopment. He mentions the dependence of devel-
oped states on underdeveloped states and vice-versa, and 
tends thus to intensify the propagation of the concept of 
interdependent development. (This concept is dealt with 
again in the next section, 2.3.) 
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Santos(1974;1975) is cautious in his treatment of 
Marxism as a potential foundation for the study of under-
development and his apparent effort at vindicating Harvey 
(1973) is 8 demonstration of his dissociation from a dog-
matic Marxism. He recognises in Harvey*s(1973) work a 
Marxist methodology but, it can be inferred, does not regard 
Harvey(1973) as a 'pure* Marxist : *It is fortunate that 
D.Harvey is speaking of a method and not a doctrine' (San-
tos, 1975). Santos(1975) is prepared to accept Marxist 
concepts but not unconditionally so; hence the caveat 
•It is by studying the very notion of his-
toric time, which is basic to the Marxist 
method, that one can understand why some of 
Marx's interpretations have become inadequate; 
the method therefore remains necessary. But 
it is important to avoid the snare of temp-
oral myopia...' (Santos,1975). Finally, in Santos' 
(1975) paper a global approach to the problem of under-
development through domination is discerned, along with his 
rejection of 'pure* Marxism for geography : 'The 
facts, universally acknowledged to be true 
for our time, are the following : an increased 
need to accumulate capital, attended by its 
concentration and the necessity for its circ-
ulation on a world-wide scale; the control 
of production and consumption by multi-nation-
al firms at the international level, through 
monopoly, research and all-powerful advertising. 
These new conditions, dating from after the 
second World War, invalidate any study which, 
taking Marx as its authority, seeks to re-
interpret his ideas without taking account of 
the renewal of historical categories' (Santos,1975). 
Regardless of discord on certain conceptual issues, 
the combined appeal of Slater(1973), Brookfield(1975), and 
Santos(1974;1975), is for a geography of development and 
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underdevelopment freed from capitalist ideology. Perhaps 
the paramount feature then of the changed paradigm in deve-
lopment geography is that it has exposed the import of ideo-
logy in studies of the spatial consequences of any given 
socio-economic structure. Theory rooted in capitalist ideo-
logy evades the realities of the development of capitalism. 
The occurrence of underdevelopment in societies linked into 
the international capitalist economy is not recognised in 
orthodox development geography as an offshoot of the deve-
lopment of capitalism. It follows that the theories of 
orthodox development geography have tended to advocate 
'development* in underdeveloped regions by the very means 
which originally gave rise to regional economic and social 
disparities. 
2.3 Colonialism. Dependence, and Underdevelopment 
The ideologies which have spawned the nascent para-
digm in development geography have, besides revealing the 
strictures of orthodox development geography, introduced 
also to the discipline concepts which have hitherto been 
either eschewed or simply taken for granted. Particular 
emphasis is devoted in the present section to the concepts 
of colonialism, dependence, and underdevelopment. 
Colonialism has received some, albeit scant, analy-
tically critical attention from geographers. Robequain 
(1941) dealt with problems of colonialism in the Netherlands 
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East Indies. The first of his two papers threw light on the 
types of European colonisation; the second dealt with the 
indigenous economy of the Netherlands East Indies. Charac-
teristic of colonialism was the concentration of European 
capital in enormous land tracts which changed hands among 
anonymous companies (*societes anonymes*) by means of trans-
actions in the stock exchanges of Amsterdam, London, New 
York, and Paris. Citing evidence from 1937, Robequain(1941) 
detailed how, in Java, almost a half million ha. of 
privately owned land was in the hands of 119 proprietors. 
Five years later, the same author, in a more far-
reaching study, asserted that *Security on the seas 
and penetration into new countries were twin 
designs dictated to the Western nations by 
their hunger for raw materials to feed their 
industries and supply the demands of the 
swarms of workers* (Robequain,1946:320). The fulfil-
ment of these aims was provided by the Malay world of the 
East Indies. 
Robequain(1946) aside, very few geographers endea-
voured to explain the spatial processes of colonialism in 
any great depth until the 1970*s when the search for 
*relevance», social justice, and new theory encouraged 
analyses of the determinants of spatial inequities at all 
levels in society. An early work accompanying this new 
wave of interest was Brcokfield*s Colonialism. Development 
and Dependence (1972) . 
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Brookfield(1972) writes of colonialism as '...a 
thoroughgoing, comprehensive and deliberate 
penetration of a local or "residentiary" 
system by the agents of an external system, 
who aim to restructure the patterns of 
organisation, resource use, circulation 
and outlook so as to bring these into a 
linked relationship with their own system* (Brookfield, 
1972:1 ff). He remarks on the value of separating the 
economic, political, and cultural forces stimulated by the 
*agents of the external system* and also enunciates an 
early critique of diffusionist theories of development, 
which neglect the potential negative repercussions of these 
forces. Brookfield(1972) suggests that modernizatlor is s 
phase following in the wake of imperialism which ^ay not 
auger well for development in a politically independent 
ex-colony. 
These contributions by geographers notwithstanding, 
conceptual clarification is sought in this otudy outside 
of the discipline and recourse is made to works emanating 
from disciplines which have, until now, experienced closed 
familiarity with colonialism, dependence, underdevelopment, 
and internal colonialism. 
Empire-building by the states of western Europe 
involved an expansion of political and economic authority 
and control over territories spatially separated from the 
metropolitan seat of empire. A plethora of meanings is 
attached to the concept of imperialism, the force which 
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germinated colonialism, and the scope of this study precludes 
a review of literature surrounding the tern-', what is of 
concern here is the theory of colonialism, which relates 
to thfc structures embodied in and sustaining the colony. 
Whereas a theory of imperialism would represent a form of 
explanation of the ideologies inspiring colonialism and the 
concomitant economic stimulus for territorial expansionism, 
a theory of colonialism encompasses an exposition of ideo-
logies and manifestations thereof particularly within the 
colony. Of course, the relationship between metropc]e and 
colony may not be ignored for it is vital to an understand-
ing of the evolution, transformation, or demise of colonial-
ism. Of im erialism then, suffice it to state, following 
Barratt-Brown(^974), that *At all times the concept 
of imperialism has been used to encompass the 
outward drive of certain peoples...to build 
empires - both formal colonies and privileged 
positions in markets, protected sources of 
materials and extended opportunities for 
profitable employment of labour* (Barratt-Brown,1974: 
22). 
Brett(1973) furnishes a lucid statement on the 
nature of colonialism and underdevelopment and their inter-
relationship. Colonialism, contends Brett(1973), can be 
traced to ideologies within the metropolitan country and in 
the colony, and he offers an analysis of the social, econo-
mic, and political structures of colonialism, relating them 
to the ideologies of one colonial ruling class„ 
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Brett(1973) endorses the view that 'Capitalism had 
evolved organically in the areas of origin, but it was 
injected into the colonial world from the outside...* (Brett, 
1973:°34). The ideological impulse for this injection came 
from a colonial ruling class, whose values embodied the 
assumptions that '...the colonized peoples were 
not capable of governing themselves "under 
the strenuous conditions cf the modern world", 
and that the relationship between the interests 
of colonized and colonizer was an essentially 
reciprocal and creative rather than an exploi-
tative and contradictory one' (Brett,1973:41). 
Capitalism was introduced into the colonies under 
political and economic conditions specific to each colony. 
This differential form of evolution of Eritish colonies 
arose from *. .the ideological presuppositions 
introduced into...(each)...situation by the 
new governing class, and those originating 
in the exigencies of the local social sit-
uation which they had to bring under their 
own control* (Brett,1973:43)• Ultimately, however, 
colonialism relied on the continuing economic and political 
subjugation of the colonised. Institutionalisation tc 
maintain this state of affairs restricted political repre-
sentation of the colonised and encouraged pre-colonial 
modes of production among the colonised. The objective 
usually was to assure cheap labour for settler agriculture 
and industry, thus further entrenching expatriate power 
within the colony as well as motivating further capital 
investment from the metropolitan country. 
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Colonialism, in its political dimension at least, 
has not persisted and while many of its spatial character-
istics have been retained in various independent states no 
longer under colonial administration, certain of its oth-r 
inherent structures have left the ex-colonies in a state of 
dependence vis-a-vis some exogenous power. Brett(1973) 
outlines the connection between the legacy of colonialism, 
dependence, development, and underdevelopment in a number 
of succint definitions. Development, for him, denotes 
*...a change process characterized by 
increased productivity, equalization in the 
distribution of the social product, and the 
emergence of indigenous institutions whose 
relations with the outside world...are 
characterized by equality rather than by 
dependence or subordination* (Brett,1973:-3). Convers-
ely, underdevelopment denotes '...a condition of 
dependence - one in which the activities of 
a given society are subjected to the over-
riding control of an exterr.al power over 
which it can exert little direct influence* (Brett, 
1973-13). Finally, *Colonialism can be accused 
of "the development of underdevelopment" if 
it can be shown that its impact upon local 
society was such that it created a situation 
in which the latter could only continue to 
function by continuing to accept dependence 
on the dominant external powers* (Brett,1973-13). 
The concept of dependence stems from the works of 
nationalist or socialist anti-imperialism theorists in Latin 
America (Chilcote and £delstein,1974). It has been utilised 
in many settings, including Africa (Amin,1972) and Canada 
(cf. Levitt,1970;Laxer,1973)• Dependence as a concept in 
development studies has profited much from the critiques of 
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Frank's work (e.g. Oxaal,Barnett, and Booth,1975); and 
although attempts have been made to condemn the validity of 
its use (e.g. Lall,1975), no alternative more feasible 
concept has been advanced to describe the fundamental link 
between development and underdevelopment in integrated 
economic systems. 
For Brookfield(1975), the concept of dependence 
underpins his theory of interdependent development. Regret-
tably, Brookfield's(1975) discourse on interdependent 
development tends to cloud the precise nature of interdepen-
dence. It is assumed here that '...the continuing 
interest of metropolitan capitalists in the 
underdeveloed countries, where today this 
involves investment in manufacturing more than 
in primary production, implies some economic 
development, but dependent development...'(Barratt-
Brown,1974:234), and further, as Brookfield(1975) would 
agree, some interdependence too. However, the balance of 
benefits is not encompassed in the term 'interdependent 
development' and this deficiency gives rise to the notion 
of symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependence, 
Chilcote(1974) clarifies the theoretical association 
between dependence and internal colonialism, in which case 
a peripheral society is dependent upon a society at the 
economic core of a country. He also draws attention to 
the new structures of dependence whereby foreign firms 
replace the colonial metropole in dominating the economy 
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of an underdeveloped state. These structures are dealt 
with in the following section and again in Chapter Five. 
2.4 Internal Colonialism 
Hechter(1975) formulates a model of internal colon-
ialism and demonstrates its utility in his study of the 
disadvantaged Celtic *fringe* in the context of Britain*s 
development between the years 1536 and 1966. The postulates 
and conclusions of Hechter*s(1975) analysis are enlarged 
upon and reinforced here by way of reference to other 
approaches to internal colonial structures; in particular 
to those dealing with internal colonialism in South Africa. 
Natioi. ^ 1 development, according to Hechter (1975 ), 
may come about in the process *...by which a state 
characterized by sectional, or otherwise com-
peting economies, polities, and cultures, 
within a given territory, is transformed into 
a society composed of a single, all-pervasive, 
and in this sense "national" economy, polity, 
and culture* (Hechter,1975:17). Impediments to nation-
al development may thus be broken down into problems of 
cultural, economic, and political integration and/or sep-
aration. The overriding problem of integration is rooted 
ir the existence of *...two collectivities or 
objectively distinct cultural groups:(l)the 
core, or dominant cultural group which occu-
pies territory extending from the political 
center of the society (e.g.the locus of the 
central government) outward to those terri-
tories largely occupiied by the subordinate, 
ox (2) peripheral cultural group* (Hechter,1975:13). 
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The dimensions of the model in spatial, economic, 
political, and. wltural terms are postulated by Hechter 
(1975) as follows : *The spatially uneven wave of 
modernization over state territory creates 
relatively advanced and less advanced groups. 
As a consequence of this initial fortuitous 
advantage, there is crystallization of the 
unequal distribution of resources and power 
between the two groups. The superordinate 
group, or core, seeks to stabilize and mono-
polize its advantages through policies aiming 
at the institutionalization of the existing 
stratification system. It attempts to regulate 
the allocation of social roles such that those 
roles commonly defined as having high prestige 
are reserved for its members. Conversely, 
individuals from the less advanced group are 
denied access to these roles. This stratification 
system, which may be termed a cultural division 
of labor, contributes to the development of 
distinctive ethnic identification in the two 
groups. Actors come to categorize themselves 
and others according to the range of roles 
each may be expected to play. They are aided 
in this categorization by the presence of 
visible signs, or cultural markers, which are 
seen to characterize both groups. At this 
stage, acculturation does not occur because 
it is not in the interests of institutions 
within the core* (Hechter,1975-9). 
From these conditions (which aptly apply to the 
South African case) arises the internal colony, which 
Hechter(1975) equates with the periphery. Hechter(1975) 
asserts, furthermore, that when the periphery suffers 
economic disadvantages as well as being culturally distinct 
•...the likelihood of increasing regional equality appears 
to be even more remote* (Hechter,1975:133)• This argument 
he illustrates by way of reference to the consequences of 
industrialization in Britain (i.e. the 'spatially uneven 
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wave of modernization') for regional equity. He is able to 
conclude that : *Group consciousness among the Welsh 
and Scottish in the nineteenth century arose 
around cultural symbols which differentiated 
these regions from England; whereas in the 
twentieth century such consciousness has been 
stimulated by an awareness of persisting region-
al underdevelopment. Bureaucratic administration 
seldom seems to enable less advantaged groups 
to achieve resources equal to those of the 
dominant groups. Hence disadvantaged groups 
are likely to demand that decision-making be 
"localized" so that their special problems 
might become appreciated and therefore taken 
into account in the allocation process* (Hechter,1975: 
310). 
Cnly a few salient aspects of Kechter*s(1975) model 
have been extracted to provide the basis upon which to 
devise a model of internal colonialism pertinent to the 
South African situation. Clearly, Hechter(1975) has present-
ec
*
 s
 conflict model of national development under given con-
ditions. For him *...national development may be inhibited 
by the desires of the peripheral group for independence 
from a situation perceived to be exploitative* (Hechter, 
1975:10). This feature of his model is worthy of special 
attention and is taken up again in the next section of the 
chapter. 
As Hechter(1975) remarks, his model is yet imperfect 
and one significant point of ambiguity lies in the terri-
torial expression of internal colonialism. When he writes 
of core and periphery he i3 applying the terms to conscious 
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collectivities and not necessarily to the spatial arrange-
ment of society, although he does imply that the core 
(cultural group) and the core (spatial locus of capital and 
power) may coincide - *The core collectively practices dis-
crimination against the culturally distinct peoples who 
have been forced onto less accessible inferior lands* (Hech-
ter, 1975=32). Hechter(1975) pronounces his ambiguous stand 
on the territoriality of internal colonialism in a reference 
to Blauner*s(1969) consideration of American blacks as an 
internal colony. Casanova(1965) and. Stavenhagen(1965) 
offer no finite resolution to this problem although they 
too imply a coincidence of spatial peripherality and econo-
mic disadvantage on the one hand and wealth generated by 
the exploitation of the rural populace with economic and 
urban cores on the other hand. 
In the South African instance, Carter, Karis, and 
Stultz(1967) analyse the Transkei as a 'domestic colony*. 
Historical analysis lead* them to equate the relationship 
between Transkei and government in South Africa with 
imperialistic forces from which originated colonialism. 
In the latter case, colonialism was nurtured in a ter-
ritory divorced from the metropolitan colonial power, 
whereas domestic colonialism signals colonialism with-
in the territory of the colonising state. Regrettably, 
their theoretical formulations are somewhat limited. 
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Wolpe(1975) develops a stronger theoretical 
framewoz-k in his application of the internal colonialism 
model to South Africa. He establishes the association 
between territorial deprivation and spatial and cult-
ural peripherality in noting that '...the "under-
developed" (and "underdeveloping") condition 
of subordinate ethnic and racial groups and 
the geographical areas they occupy within the 
boundaries of the state, is produced and main-
tained by the same mechanisms of cultural 
domination, political oppression, and economic 
exploitation which, at the international level, 
produce the development of the advanced capital-
ist states through the imperialist underdevelop-
ment of the colonial satellites' (Wolpe,1975). Else 
where, it is stated that 'The convergence, albeit 
unevenly, of economic and political powerless-
ness with "blackness", together with the legit-
imating racial ideology, gives the society its 
unique internal colonial nature...* (Wolpe,1970). 
Wolpe(1975) contemplates the integration of labour 
from the black areas of South Africa into the 'capitalist 
circuit of production' and arrives at the conclusion that 
'This "crossing" of different modes of prod-
uction modifies the relationship between wages 
and the cost of reproducing labour-power in 
favour of capital. It is precisely this rela-
tionship which i3 the foundation of "internal 
colonialism" in South Africa' (Wolpe,1975), 
2.5 Internal Colonialism veraros Other Models 
The problem of inadequacies of orthodox models 
of development is aggravated for the student of development 
in South Africa, where the subjugation of blacks by whites 
is accompanied by the territorial segregation of the pop-
ulation on an ethnic basis to forge a spatial pattern of 
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economy and society unique to South Africa. 
Geographers have contributed to a description of 
the spatial polarisation of the South African economy in a 
few dominant cores (e.g. Fair,1975), arid they have noted 
the authority-dependency relationship between core and 
periphery in South Africa (Schmidt,1975). The level of 
understanding attained, however, has been impeded because 
development in South Africa has usually been conceptualised 
by geographers as a problem of economic integration, and 
this at the national scale. Thus, while the spatial pattern 
of economic concentration and regional spread of economic 
productivity have been described, there has been a failure 
to explain the processes of capitalist development and 
related underdevelopment. Theories of economic integration 
lead the analyst to the conclusion that development may be 
achieved by opening the way for increased capital invest-
ment from developed regions or countries in underdeveloped 
areas. That is, answers in the quest for development are 
being sought within the paradigm which inspires core 
development, and peripheral underdevelopment is not neces-
sarily perceived as a function of core development, or in 
its relationship with the development of capitalism outside 
of South Africa. The actual mechanisms which gave rise to 
the economic core-periphery dichotomy in the first place 
are taken for granted and it is in these workings that the 
answers must be. 
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On similar grounds, there are those who suggest 
that, the devices of modernization, if diffused throughout 
the space economy, will lead to the elimination of under-
development. Criticisms of this view (e.g. Brcokfield,1973) 
generally point to the fact that modernization usually 
implies an introduction of capitalism into pre-capitalist 
society and functions to benefit development at metro-
politan cores to the detriment of the periphery. 
Criticisms which may be levelled at discourses on 
development through a process of modernization may equally 
well be posited against theories of development through 
innovation diffusion in space. Diffusion of innovations 
must be subjected to deeper analysis before it may be 
argued that uhe diffusion process is concomitant with 
development. The innovations need to be understood as 
modified or novel instruments either for the perpetuation 
or for the change of socio-economic structures. It may 
wall be that an innovation, as it it, diffused through 
space, works to accelerate development at the core and 
underdevelopment at the periphery. Expressed in these 
terms, it is not difficult to visualise a possible con-
formity between the notion of modernisation and that of 
innovation diffusion. 
Integrationist and diffusionist theories may find 
more valid application in non-exploitative settings, but 
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so long as exploitative structures of economy and society 
survive, these structures must be analysed in terms of 
an alternative theory, namely conflict theory. Until 
the structures upholding core-periphery discrimination in 
the distribution of the social product are eradicated, 
conflict theory predicts confrontation within society. 
Hechter(1975) summarises the distinction between 
diffusion models of development and the internal colonialism 
model as follows : 'Given similar initial conditions, 
the mutual isolation of core and periphery, 
these models...predict different outcomes for 
national development following the heighten-
ing of interaction between these regions. 
While the diffusion model predicts a lessen-
ing of regional economic inequalities, the 
internal colonial model predicts that these 
will persist or increase. While the diffusion 
model suggests the probability of peripheral 
acculturation, the internal colonial model 
suggests the likelihood of an assertion of the 
peripheral culture in reaction to domination 
of the core. Finally, while the diffusion 
model states that functional political cleav-
ages should characterize political behavior 
in all regions of the society, the internal 
colonial model states that political cleavages 
will largely reflect significant cultural 
differences between groups' (Hechter,1975:1C). 
2.6 Summary 
Development geography is undergoing transformation. 
Redefinitions in the discipline are largely responses to 
shifting ideological commitments on the part of its prac-
ticioners. Among the repercussions of this evident change 
has been the elevation of certain theories to supersede 
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those currently applied in South Africa. 
In this chapter, the internal colonialism model 
has been put forward as an appropriate substitute for 
models which are found to be wanting when it comes to 
isolating the problem of underdevelopment in South Africa. 
The spatially uneven wave of modernization under 
the control of white settlers and capitalists; the racial 
division of labour and associated discriminatory wage 
structure; and the political subjugation cf blacks in 
South Africa are criteria which denot«"M««ks in South 
Africa as an internal colcny. Theoretically, this places 
blicks in a position of dependence upon the core, and with 
increasing dependence blacks will seek to terminate the 
so;io-economic structures of exploitation. These issues 
and th'j question of the territorial basis for the internal 
colony are addressed in the following chapters, in terms 
of the spatial impact of state and capital in Natal. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION OF NATAL 
3.1 Introduction 
The interplay among the parties ccncerned with the 
question of land partitioning in Natal is dealt with in 
this chapter. Discussion focusses on the relationship 
between state and capitcl and their combined role in imp-
lementing the fragmentation of Natal. The narrative begins 
with the origins of the reserve system in nineteenth 
century colonial Natal, and ends with a portrayal of the 
condition of KwaZulu in 1971 - sixty years after the 
establishment of Union and ten years after the Union had 
become the Republic of South Africa. The chapter exposes 
ho ft the territorial fragmentation of Natal {?>.?.) was 
followed by the penetration and fragmentation of Zululand 
by white interests (3-3). Developments between 1910 and 
1971 are then considered (3-4). Ideological transform-
ations at uhe core before 1971 are dealt wioh (3-5), and 
peripheral responses are outlined (3.6). KvjaZulu is then 
set in the perspective of the South African space economy 
in 1971 (3-7), before the partial consolidation proposals 
were made. A brief summary of the chapter is then presented 
(3.3). 
3.2 The Reserves 
Settlement of whites in Natal commenced in 13?4 
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with the first English residents at Pert Natal (Durban). 
Shortly afterwards, across the Drakensoerg mountains in 
the west of the territory came Voortrekkers who estab-
lished government over 'Natalia' in 1333, a year after 
their- arrival. Under the Volksraad , farms of ?,500ha 
were generally allocated gratis to all white citizens of 
the Natalia Republic, some receiving two for services 
considered meritorious by the community (Christopher,1971). 
An influx of thousands of Zulus into Natalia in flight 
froj; wars in Zululand alarmed the Volksraad and ics 
members resolved in 1341 to pressure all refugees into the 
area between the Mtamvuma and Mzimvubu rivers (Welsh,1971)^. 
British intervention in the political affairs of 
the region prevented the Volksraad resolution from ever 
reaching fruition. Earlier refusals by British government 
to annex the settlement at Port Natal were reversed in an 
assertion of sovereignty over the entire colony of Natal 
in 1343 and the appointment of Henry Cloete as British Lands 
Commissioner in Natal (Vtelsh,1971). Intervention cul-
minated in the annexation of Natal as a British colony 
in 1345, after two years as a district of Eritain's Cape 
Colony, and it was accorded the status of responsible gov-
ernment by the imperial government in 1393. 
Within a few months of annexation in 1343, a 
Locations Commission was set up by the colonial government 
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Map 3. Natal : Magisterial Districts 
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to provide reserves for the blacks in Natal, whom by Cloete's 
estimates numbered between 30,000 and 100,000 in that year 
(Welsh,1971). The establishment of locations, or reserves, 
was perceived as necessary '...because freehold 
ownership not only was an unknown concept to 
the tribal African but also would have exposed 
him to the danger of land-hungry Europeans'(•Brookes 
and Hurwitz,1957:1). In its report of March, 1347, the 
commission recommended that provision be made for about 
ten reserves interspersed among white farms and each accom-
odating 10,000 blacks so that individual black families 
would have about 40ha of land suitable for grazing and 
crop production (Brookes and Hurwitz,1957). Although 
these conditions were not realised in their entirety, the 
creation of reserves had already begun with the demarc-
ation in November, 1346 of the Zwartkop reserve for about 
3,000 blacks (see Map No. 4). In March, 1347 the Umvoti, 
Umlazi, and Inanda reserves were demarcated (Brookes and 
Hurwitz,1957). By 1349, with the addition of the Umzin-
yati, Impofana, and Kahlamba reserves, there were seven 
reserves in Natal (Brookes and Hurwitz,1957). 
The outcome of the 1349 Land Commission in Natal 
was an easing of existing constraints on land by government 
to whites and the immediate repercussion of the commission's 
recommendations was the division of over 300,000ha among 
360 white claimants, amongst whom were many of Ratal's 
leading land speculators (Slater,1975). Slater(1975) estab-
lishes the association between land speculation in colonial 
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Natal and London-based capital as well as linking capital 
with political interests in the colony. Thus, the '...in-
terests of the colonial merchant-landowners coincided with 
those of powerful interest groups in the metropolis' (Sla-
ter,1975). 
Among the means of extracting profitable returns 
on land investments was the promotion of settlement schemes 
in Natal which would give to British immigrants land and 
employment in an ostensibly thriving cotton growing region. 
The plots of land involved were sufficiently small for 
immigrants either to purchase further land from the spec-
ulators or to abandon farming and re-sell their land to 
the land-holding companies. So it was that by 13^0, 
fifteen of the leading speculators in Natal owned 
233,400ha of land (Christopher,1969;Slater.1975). 
The Natal Land and Colonisation Company, the 
major firm engaged in land speculation, had 'powerful 
friends' (Slater,1975) in London and some of the senior 
company officials were in Natal's Legislative Council. 
During a dispute following the stagnation of the colonial 
sector of the rural economy (due to 3abour and capital 
shortages), two of Natal's largest landowners campaigned 
in the Legislative Council to force blacks living on white 
farms to work for the whites (Slater,1975). On the other-
side, many landowners, including the Natal Land and Col-
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onisation Company, lobbied for a system by which land-
owners would extract rent in the form of cash or produce 
from black 'tenants'. A compromise favouring the latter 
group was achieved and this influenced the decision to 
introduce indentured labourers from India into the colony 
(Slater,1975). 
Virtually indiscriminate Crown-land disposal to 
whites under low rental conditions disturoed the imperial 
government which, in 1353, had the laws permitting these 
land grants repealed. The area of alienated land in 
Natal remained almost unchanged until twenty years later, 
in the late l370's (Christopher,1971). By 1374, roughly 
two-thirds of Natal colony's total area had been alienated. 
Of the alienated land, one sixth had been set aside as 
reserves for occupance by blacks (de Kiewiet,1937). By 
1332 a total of 42 reserves and 21 mission reserves covered 
over 390,000ha (Brookes and Hurwitz,1957). 
Changing credit facilities affected changing 
patterns of Crown-land allocation to whites (Christopher, 
1971), but the position of blacks vis-a-vis access to 
land remained untempered, following the 1332 report of 
the Natal Native Commission (Colony of Natal,1332). The 
report, in which it was established that approximately 
55% of Natal's 375,000 blacks lived on white-owned land 
(either private or Crown land), recojimended that the 
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areal extent of the reserves should remain unchanged and 
that land sales to blacks in the reserves should still be 
prohibited. Outside the reserves, where some blacks held 
title to land, through the introduction of 'better modes 
of cultivation', progress might be made '...to elevate 
the owners in the human scale...' (Colony of Natal,1332:26)^. 
Shortly before the annexation of Zululand to Natal 
in 1397, the distribution of blacks in Natal was reported 
to be as follows : locations and mission reserves - 254,331; 
private (white) lands - 253,354; Crown lands - 21,699 
(Colony of Natal,1396). The proportion of blacks on white 
land was 52.4% of the total black population of Natal, 
showing little variation since 1332, and mirroring thus 
the minor changes in land alienation over that time. 
Printed fifty years after the first white settlers landed 
in Natal, the figures illustrate how an exogenous influence 
had superimposed on the landscape a pattern based on mon-
etary value, and with relative disregard for the local 
populace. Blacks simply acauired the title of squatter 
or tenant as boundaries were drawn about their traditional 
territory in response to market forces beyond their control. 
The successful territorial fragmentation of Natal relied 
heavily upon co-operation with or participation in gov-
ernment, also exclusive to the exogenous group. 
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3.3 Whites Penetrate Zululand 
Penetration of Zululand by white settler farmers 
began after 1332, when Transvaal Boers started occupying 
land which WAS later set up as the New Republic in north-
western Zululand (see Map No.l) (Keppel-Jones,1949). This 
outpost of the South African Republic (Transvaal), and the 
land subsequently added to it and known as Proviso B, was, 
according to the Boers, a concession to them by the Zulu 
King Cetewayo whom they claimed to have assisted in an 
inter-tribal war. Confusion surrounds the conditions of 
the concession5. Nevertheless, the area came under 
white control and was eventually annexed to Natal at the 
time of tht Anglo-Boer War of 1399 to 1902 (Keppel-
Jones,1949). 
Whereas some Natalians had entertained the idea 
of using Zululand as a suitable place for blacks dis-
placed from their colony, it was perceived by others as 
an exploitable hinterland. The latter group, comprising 
mainly farmers, had in the 1390's imposed much pressure 
on the Colonial Governor to allow white occupation of 
southern Zululand (Marks,1970). Annexation served the 
ideals of these petitioners well and it clearly had the 
effect of extending into Zululand conditions of land 
partitioning similar to those in Natal. 
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On the 29tn December, 1397, the Prime Minister 
of Natal signed the Act (Act No.37, 1397) for the annex-
ation of Zululand to Natal. Earlier in that year, the 
Secretary of State for the British Colonies had detailed 
to the Governor of Natal, Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, the 
conditions under which he would advise Gueen Victoria to 
assent to the annexation of Zululand to Natal. The 
primary condition was that the existing land tenure system 
in Zululand remain unaffected for a period of five years 
after annexation, and that no grants of land be made to 
whites during that time. In the interim, a joint Imperial 
and Colonial committee was to be set up to delimit reserves 
within Zulu -^ nd. After the lapse of five years, the 
Natal Government would be free to dispose of the un-
reserved land at its own discretion and also to proclaim 
townships '...if such townships should become necessary 
in conseouence of progressive mining enterprise'(Great 
Britain Correspondence relating to Zululand,17.5.1397). 
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In a minute to Prime Minister Binns on 3 October-, 
1397, Governor Sir Hely-Hutchinson suggested that it would 
be expedient that no changes be made whatsoever for about 
two years after the annexation, and 'In that case 
the Joint Boundary Commission would not be 
appointed after this interval...had elapsed, 
and should then proceed to carry out their 
work by degrees, allowing ample time for its 
performance so that there mav be no cause for 
sudden or unnecessary excitement among the 
Native Population' (Great Britain:Corr. relating to 
Zululand,3.10.1397) He also supposed that '...many 
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of the farmers who come into the country 
later on will be glad to let the Natives remain 
where they are, cultivating their small mealie 
patches, and to levy rent from them, treating 
them as servants. In any case the work of 
delimitation will be a matter requiring much 
careful handling' (Great Britain:Corr. relating to 
Zululand,3.10.1897). In a subsequent despatch to 
Chamberlain, Hely-Hutchinson was able to claim that the 
announcement of the impending annexation '...has been 
favourably received by the Natives in Zululand, but with-
out any particular enthusiasm' (Great Britain:Corr. 
relating to Zululand,19.11.1897). 
The two-man Zululand Lands Delimitation Commis-
sion conducted their enquiry over two years. Their 
recommendations, reported in October 1904, were accepted 
by the imperial government in their entirety. Twenty one 
reserves were delimited, covering an area of one and a half 
million ha. (Colony of Natal,1905). These reserves were 
vested in the Zululand Native Trust under a deed of 
grant in 19096. 
In a retrospective statement, a member of the 
above commission and former Chief Magistrate of Zululand 
from 1898 until 1906, Sir Chas. Saunders, stated that 
although the Imperial Government had accepted the commis-
sion's recommendations, the Natal Government had made 
objections because not enough land had been made available 
for whites. He felt that had he been aware of the fact 
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that blacks would be unable to acquire title to land in 
Zululand, he would not have agreed to the quantity of land 
that the commission proposed for white purchase (Union 
of South Africa,19l6(2)). 
Sugar cane cultivation became the dominant prac-
tice of whites settling in Zululand and their economic 
success was given an impetus by the concessions offered 
by government to sugar cane growers and millers who 
would settle in Zululand. Tenders were called for the 
construction of sugar mills which would serve concession 
holders only. Sir J.L.Hulett submitted the successful 
tender and built his first mills at Felixton in 1908, 
and at Amatikulu in 1911 (Osborne,1964). 
The alliance established between government and 
white agriculturalists and early industrialists facilitated 
and legitimised the process of territorial fragmentation 
and economic penetration. Thus, at the time of Union 
in 1910, 75,710 of the 266,066 blacks in Zululand were 
on alienated land (Union of South Africa,1911). 
3.4 Union and After 
Following Union, the South African government 
passed legislation enforcing racial segregation in all 
four of the country's constituent provinces. The 1913 
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Native Land Act made provision for 2,667,000ha of 
'scheduled Native Areas' in Natal, in the form of 69 
locations and 19 mission reserves, thus formalising the 
existing reserve system (Natal henceforth embraces Zulu-
land, except where otherwise signified). 
A commission was then charged with the task of 
delimiting further areas for black occupation '...so 
that future adjustments of land areas may not be nec-
essary' (Union of South Africa,19l6:4) and submitted its 
report to Parliament in 1916. The Beaumont Commission 
recommended the addition of l,595,OOOha to the areas 
scheduled in the 1913 Act for the blacks of Natal. In 
seeking to lessen friction between blacks and whites 
through the consolidation of the reserves, the commission 
'...found it impossible to follow consistently 
this priciple on account of the objections 
which were raised to the inclusion of European-
occupied farms within proposed Native areas. 
The nature and extent, therefore, of the 
proposed Native areas have been largely deter-
mined by this objection' (Union of South Africa,1916:4). 
This stricture led to the selection of additional land 
according to an '...order of preference:-
l)Mission lands; 
2)Native-owned lands; 
3)Crown lands; 
4)unoccupied European-owned lands; 
5)European-owned lands solely occupied by Natives, and; 
6)lastly, where this could not be avoided, land 
in actual occupation by Europeans' (Union of South 
Africa,1916:11). 
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Giving evidence before the commission, whites 
displayed their concern with black-white territorial 
relationships in strong, if not often insular terms. A 
member of the Legislative Assembly advocated that 'Seg-
regation is good for both races and better control can be 
kept of the natives in the locations' (Union of South 
Africa,1916(2):423). Another member, in an expression 
of some foresight, suggested that appropriate steps 
should be taken '...in order that they (blacks) 
may work and govern themselves within certain 
limits as self-contained communities independent 
of the white population'(Union of South Africa,1916 
(2):424). 
There was common resentment shown for absentee 
ownership?, as well as the expression of the opinion 
that the reserves were not crowded but that they were 
poorly cultivated and that this should not jeopardise 
white control over land. Senator Sir J.L.Hulett, indus-
trial and agricultural capitalist, contended that 'If 
the natives cultivated and used the land in 
a civilised manner there would be more room 
for them in the reserves', and '...if any 
areas were declared "neutral" areas in which 
either whites or blacks could purchase land... 
In the long run the land would all fall into 
the hands of the Europeans' (Union of South Africa, 
1916(2):433ff). 
Another contentious issue was black urbanisation. 
Many whites opposed moves which might encourage this 
and often proposed that blacks be permitted to buy land 
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outside the reserves, but only in rural areas. Con-
tentious too was the fact that mission reserves allotted 
land, in some cases, to blacks converted to Christianity 
and admitted to the reserve. The magistrate of Verulam 
found this to be '...a rank injustice, and these Mission 
Reserves are rank humbugs* (Union of South Africa,1916(2)f 
444). 
Tenants, that is blacks on white-owned property 
who were in the employ of the owners as a condition of 
being there since before its alienation, were the sub-
jects of much debate. One sugar planter declared : 
'The way that I get rid of obnoxious Kaffirs 
is as follows : I lease the land to a coolie 
and he cultivates all round and crowds them 
up so that eventually they go, and then I get 
rid of the coolie' (Union of South Africa,1916(2):45D. 
The majority of black witnesses before the 
Beaumont Commission were tribal chiefs, although a few 
black landowners also gave evidence. Their opposition 
to the white viewpoint, by requesting more reserve land 
and permission to get tenure of land outside the reserves,' 
is discussed later, in section 3.6 of this chapter. 
The recommendations of the Beaumont Commission 
were rejected by Parliament in Cape Town and five separate 
local commissions were appointed on a regional basis to 
revise its findings and proposals. In 1918, the report 
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of Mr. Maurice Evans on the Natal reserves was submitted 
to Parliament (Union of South Africa,1918). The two-
man committee had inspected all the areas recommended by 
the 1916 Commission, travelling on horseback and on foot. 
Among its observations was that '...when one con-
siders the fertile and profitable sugar belt 
of the coast, the rich agricultural portions 
of the Midlands, and the healthy stock-lands 
of the uplands, and compares these with the 
rough, stony, often precipitous native areas 
in the sub-coastal districts and the hot, dry, 
thorn valleys higher up country, it is perfect-
ly certain that the prairie or unimproved value 
of the European lands are very much higher 
than those allocated to the natives' (Union of South 
Africa,1918). 
The recommendations of this commission were also 
rejected in Parliament and it was not until 1936 that 
provision was made for the addition of more land to the 
reserves as scheduled in 1913. The Native Trust and 
Land Act(Act No. 18 of 1936) added 450,000ha to the 
Natal reserves, mostly adjacent to the existing reserves 
so as not to further fragment white lands or to alter 
the white corridors and enclaves (Best and Young,forth-
coming). Areas listed as Released Areas in this Act 
were released from the provisions of the 1913 Act and made 
available for purchase by the South African Native Trust. 
When, in 1948, the National Party came to power, 
it appointed a commission '...to conduct an exhaus-
tive enquiry into and to report on a compre-
hensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the 
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Native Areas with a view to developing within 
them a social structure in keeping with the 
culture of the Native and based on effective 
socio-economic planning' (Union of South Africa,1955). 
Appointed late in 1950, the Tomlinson Commission, named 
after its chairman Prof. Tomlinson, submitted four years 
later an eighteen volume report, almost 4,000 pages in 
length. 
Dealing with the spatial configuration of the 
reserves, the commission recommended the consolidation 
of 'Bantu Areas' into seven blocks about 'historico-
logical heartlands' (Union of South Africa.1955(16):50). 
Within Natal, it was proposed, the Ingwavuma area should 
go to Swaziland and the 'Bantu Area' be consolidated 
about the Zulu heartland, north of the Durban-Pietermaritz-
burg line (see Maps No's. 2 & 3)• Existing 'Bantu 
Areas' south of Durban were more closely tied to the 
Transkei. Crown lands should be used first in the con-
solidation of the 'Bantu Areas'. 
Construed within the ideals of segregation and 
the termination of the migrancy of blacks to white cities, 
active decentralisation planning began after, and largely 
in spite of, the tabling of the Tomlinson Commission 
report. Arguing that agricultural output had to be 
improved and other economic activities introduced in order 
to develop the reserves, the commission called for the 
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establishment of industries within the reserves (Union 
of South Africa,1955). This recommendation was rejected 
by government and decentralisation policy was designed to 
encourage industrial location in the border areas abutting 
the reserves . 
Thus, '...security would be ensured for 
white civilization and opportunities created 
for both racial groups in all spheres, each 
in its own territory or among its own people -
if after a period of fifty years an approximately 
eoual proportion of whites and Bantu has been 
reached in European territory* (Union of South Africa, 
1956:3). Furthermore, 'The Government regards the 
development of industries owned by Europeans 
but reauiring large numbers of native labourers 
in suitable European areas near Bantu territory 
as of the utmost importance for the sound socio-
economic development of the Bantu areas and 
intends to take the necessary steps gradually 
to create the desired conditions for attracting 
industries to such areas' (Union of South Africa, 
1956:9). 
Incentives to industrialists were first offered 
in I960 by Prime Minister Verwoerd, who had, in his 
capacity as Minister of Native Affairs, voiced strong 
opposition in 1956 to the idea of promoting white-owned 
industry ^ n?the reserves. Evidently insufficient to 
attract private industry to the border areas, the induce-
ments were supplemented by others in 1964. 
Industrial decentralisation still did not 
accelerate and the Physical Planning and Utilization of 
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ResourcesnAct of 1967 instituted restrictive measures 
to limit industrialisation in the cities, thus effectively 
trying to force decentralisation. The Act also opened the 
way for white industrialists to locate plants within the 
•homelands' with the Bantu Investment Corporation (first in-
stituted by government to promote black industrialisation 
in the reserves) acting as agents and as a source of loan 
capital. Further incentives followed in 1968, among 
which were tax holidays of up to five years for decentral-
ising industrialists (Financial Mail.30.3.1973 federated 
Chambers of Industries,1973). Studies have revealed the 
measure of success achieved in respect of these persuasive 
efforts to be minimal (Rogerson,1974a;1974b). 
Paralleling attempts to promote economic growth 
in the reserves was the evolution of constitutional mach-
inery to bring the reserves to eventual political indepen-
dence from the rest of South Africa, through a series of 
phases. In 1959 the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government 
Act provided for the investiture of a black 'territorial 
authority* as the highest organ of internal administration 
for each reserve complex. Subsequently, a black 'legislative 
assembly* would be established to supersede the 'territorial 
authority'. Further legislation followed in the Bantu 
Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 and the Bantu Home-
lands Constitution Act of 1971 which allowed for the next 
phase whereby a 'homeland' with a 'legislative assembly' 
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would become a 'self-governing territory'. The final 
phase would be full political independence. Progression 
through these phases is controlled by the white central 
government and it is only when the final phase is reached 
that the black 'legislative assembly' may decide to accept 
political independence or not". 
The antecedents of the territorial organisation 
of South Africa in general and Natal in particular have 
been considered above. Attention turns now to the trans-
forming ideologies in which the forementioned developments 
were rooted. 
3.5 Ideological Transformations at the Core 
For the very reason that the core and peripheral 
'conscious collectivities' in South Africa are histori-
cally divisible on racial grounds does the notion of 
accomodation between the two white groups imply a bond 
which transcends the nationalism of Afrikaners or the 
laissez-faire liberalism of the English. 
Two factors predominate in the analysis on 
cohesion of the white core. Firstly, there is the aspect 
of white supremacy. Secondly, whether seen as a means 
or an end, a capitalist economy under white control is 
fostered by both white groups today. 
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The sources and manifestations of Afrikaner 
nationalism are extensively documented. Munger(1967) 
distinguishes in South Africa two nationalisms, Afrikaner 
and African, '...revolving around each other like a binary 
star and far outshining the weak light of a nebulous South 
African nationalism' (Munger,1967:1). For Stultz(1974), 
the success of Afrikaner nationalism cannot be measured 
independently of the role of English-speaking whites in 
South African politics. A black view holds that 'It is 
in the Afrikaner's preoccupation with considerations of 
survival that the crux of South Africa's race problem lies. 
The solution is also there' (Ngubane,1963:15); and an 
Afrikaner view has it that 'The apartheid idea is...pre-
eminently peculiar to the Afrikaner...'(Rhoodie and 
Venter,1959:17), and '...apartheid is not, as it is so 
often quite incorrectly alleged, a static state of affairs 
designed to keep the Bantu for ever subservient to the 
White man. On the contrary, apartheid is a dynamic 
process which holds the promise of complete self-determin-
ation in the future' (Rhoodie and Venter,1959:vii). 
The ideologies of the English-speaking whites 
constitute the other fundamental component of the core. 
British imperialism in South Africa left this group in 
control of a rapidly evolving capitalist economy. Although 
not discernably nationalistic in any sense, the English-
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speaking whites are characterised, in South African his-
tory, by their pragmatic, liberal capitalism. This 
'liberalism' catered for early segregation in South Africa 
which was, ostensibly, protectionism based on humanitarian 
principles (see Welsh,1971:27, for example). In the 
transformation from imperially-dominated to locally-orienta-
ted capitalism in South Africa, the major impulses came 
from English-speaking ideologists. Bozzoli(1975), deal-
ing with the ideological impetus for local manufacturing, 
illuminates this important facet of the development of 
capitalism in South Africa. 
The place of capitalism in the core is significant 
for it represents the pervading bond between the two white 
groups at the core and it is toward this bond which 
transformations at the core have moved. That is, '...re-
lations between capitalist development, apartheid policies 
and the core structure of white supremacy are essentially 
collaborative.. . • (Johnston,1970). 
After the mineral discoveries near Kimberley in 
1870 and on the Witwatersrand in 1886, Afrikaners linked 
imperialism with capitalism and 'The notion of 
"Englishness" thus evoked for the Afrikaner 
the three great evils which threatened his 
separate existence - imperialism, capitalism, 
and egalitarian liberalism' (Moodie,1975:15)- Afri-
kaners combatted this perceived threat to their identity 
by assuming an increasingly important role in capitalist 
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development (De Klerk,1975 writes of the Afrikaner as a 
'new man'). For them, capitalism had to be '...trans-
formed from its base in liberal individualism 
to an ethnic system which would work to the 
good of the Afrikaner People as a nation. This 
was to be achieved by Afrikaner control of 
both production and consumption. Afrikaner 
capital should thus be organized to support 
Afrikaner enterprise both by investment in 
Afrikaner business and by purchase of Afrikaner 
goods' (Moodie,1975:204). 
Welsh(1972) considers apartheid as a response to 
the threat of a growing class of acculturated blacks, and 
Hill(1964) asserts that 'The irreducible core of the 
policy is fear' (Hill,1964:3) • The net result of trans-
formations at the cere which gave rise to and which 
maintain white supremacy are interpreted by Adam(1976) as 
a 'de-ideologised power conflict' wherein the role of 
ideologies is merely to defend white privileges. 
Politically, the Afrikaner government of today is only 
codifying and legalising 'a well established custom* 
(Adam,1975) of segregation started by the English. 
Economically, the Afrikaners have sought increased power 
in a capitalist system. The convergence of features of 
ideologies held by both white groups at the core pivots 
on the issue of white supremacy in the economic and Politi-
cal arenas of the country. 
In Natal, the spatial impact of these ideological 
transformations reflected colonial penetration processes. 
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At first, the trekker republic of Natalia sought to 
offer its *citizens* free access to land, in fulfilment 
of its sectarian, rather than capitalistic ideals. The 
land pattern inherited by the British was not radically 
altered during their period of dominion over the territory 
(1843-1910), although land was now associated with a per-
ceived need to generate surplus value, be it by spec-
ulation, extensive farming, or the extraction of rent 
or labour from the occupants of the land. The annex-
ation of Zululand extended the field of nascent capital-
ism. After Union (1910), when land alienation became 
the prerogative of the central South African government, 
and with the closing of the ideologies of capitalism and 
Afrikaner nationalism, the territorial segregation of 
blacks from whites persisted, and is entrenched now 
in legislation, in the continuing interest of white 
state and capital. 
3.6 Peripheral Response 
Imposition of government upon blacks by the 
white core prompted varying forms of response. Colonial 
government in Natal was confronted first by organised 
and violent force, which it repulsed10. Opposition to 
the core then came from vociferous but mainly non-violent 
sources operating within and without the structure of 
legal authority upheld by the core. In I960 peripheral 
response took on a new face after the core attempted to 
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quell opposition by recourse to the legal system. The 
outlawing of black organisations intent on altering the 
racially-based core-periphery structure was followed by 
the creation of a new outlet for black opposition within 
the core dominated system of authority, in the form of 
black *homeland* governments. Black involvement with 
the territorial fragmentation of Natal by white interests 
is discussed in this section. 
Incited by factors such as the diminishing land 
available (and necessary) in traditional tribal society, 
and their limited access to capital and their subordination 
vis-a-vis whites, blacks responded in a variety of ways. 
In Natal, the voice of black opposition came from the 
black press (John Dube founded the first Zulu newspaper, 
Ilanga Lase Natal, in 1904), from tribal chiefs petitioning 
government, from the literate blacks emanating usually 
from missionary schools (the kholwa class), and from 
black organisations such as the Natal Native Congress. 
Welsh(1972) provides some insight into the opinions 
expressed by the black press. A common grievance in the 
early 1900*s was the inability of literate blacks to 
participate in the political affairs of the colony of 
Natal. Tribal chiefs also lamented their subordinate 
status in the political decision making affecting their 
territorial claims. However, this class of blacks 
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usually defended traditionalism, something which many of 
the amakholwa did not subscribe to. Thus, in their 
evidence before the Beaumont Commission, for example, many 
of the amakholwa witnesses asked to be allowed to purchase 
land outside the reserves (Union of South Africa,1916(2)). 
It was also apparent that most blacks who did at the time 
held title to land in Natal were from the kholwa class. 
Chiefs usually expressed satisfaction with the 
reserve system but called for more land and less interfer-
ence. A chief from the Umlazi division maintained that 
*The British came amongst us and we accepted 
their rule. The land that was occupied by our 
fathers they were ousted from, but they lived 
peaceably on the land on which we were born. 
We have never quarrelled with the Government 
that they may say to-day that the Europeans 
and the natives should be separated* (Union of South 
Africa,19l6(2):455). Another, Chief Stephen Mini, 
contended that *The particular method of land 
administration for natives which we prefer 
is the one that was followed by Sir Theo. 
Shepstone. He originated the locations 
which we have now, and that is what we like. 
What we wish is that the present locations 
shall be extended* (Union of South Africa,1916(2):531). 
A black land owner complained that blacks were 
troubled by *...a law which came about in 1843 from 
the late Oueen, which provided that all races 
in this country were to be treated alike, and 
now to-day those orders have been broken with-
out us black people being consulted* (Union of South 
Africa,1916(2) :514). This was a widely held view among 
the amakholwa. 
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The Natal Native Congress (NNC) constituted a 
branch of the South African Native National Congress (SANC) 
founded in 1912 by Dr. Pixley Seme11 (Karis and Carter, 
1972(1)). The NNC actively opposed government and Martin 
Lutuli, representing the Congress, stated before a South 
African Native Affairs Commission sitting in Pretoria 
that *The Natives look at it this way. Zululand 
was our own land, and although now it is 
under the Government, we ought to be the 
first. We ought not to be prohibited* (Karis and 
Carter,1972(1) :3D. He was referring to the prohibition 
of land buying by blacks, in the Zululand town of Eshowe 
in particular. 
At the national level, the SANC resolved in 1916 
to call for a rejection of the report of the Natives 
Land Commission and for the repeal of the 1913 Natives 
Land Act. Also criticised was the penetration of 
Zululand by white interests, a breach of a Royal 
proclamation (Karis and Carter,1972(l)). 
Some thirty blacks from Natal, including John 
Dube, were among the A00 delegates to the All African 
Convention (AAC) in Bloemfontein in 1935 at the time 
of the 98 t h anniversary of the Battle of Blood River(1837). 
The meeting was convened by Pixley Seme, now as president 
general of the African National Congress (ANC)(until 1923 
the SANC), and Prof. Jabavu of the Cape Native Voters' 
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Convention. Motions passed at the meeting opposed the 
1935 Land Bill and Representation of Natives Bill (Karis 
and Carter,1972(2)). An observation unanimously approved 
by the delegates was that *The true aim of land 
adjustment...should be to provide the bulk 
of the Native population, which is predominantly 
rural, with sufficient land to allow of their 
working a livelihood. 
The fact that this aim is ignored by the Native 
Land and Trust Bill can only be interpreted 
by the African people as a vague attempt to 
force them out of their reserves into a position 
of economic dependency* (Karis and Carter,1972(2): 36 ). 
Policies adopted later by the AAC included appeals 
to government to accelerate the process of *releasing* 
land ; to put an end to the eviction of blacks from 
white-owned farms; to prevent the fostering of conditions 
in the reserves which forced blacks to seek employment 
outside the reserves, on unjust terms; and, the abolition 
of restrictions on land purchases by blacks. These 
policies were reiterated at various ANC annual conferences 
too, although the AAC and ANC were never absolutely 
united. However, after the Sharpville affair in I960 
the ANC and AAC were outlawed and black opposition was 
forced to find expression through other avenues (Karis 
and Carter,1972(2)). 
It is apparent that the voices of black opposition 
to the land policies of white government went largely un-
heeded at the core. Peripherality of blacks constituted 
59 
the result of concerted efforts at the core to retain 
exclusive control over government, economy, and space. 
Following the banning of the bodies most out-
spokenly critical of legislation affecting territorial 
matters the most significant expressions of discontent 
concerning land issues have emanated from the black 
territorial authorities or legislative assemblies of 
the *homelands*. Their role is considered in the next 
chapter. 
3 -7 Contemporary Forms 
Natal»s black population is viewed in this 
passage in its relationship with the environment and 
with the labour market. At the outset it should be 
stressed that the dynamics of apartheid complicate 
attempts accurately to present the demographic character-
istics of KwaZulu. Changing *homeland* boundaries, 
census data of dubious quality, government's typology 
for human classification, dated or incomplete data 
about agricultural and other resources, are factors which 
militate against precision in the task of compilation. 
Annual growth rates of the black population are 
noted to vary between 2.9% p.a. (Maasdorp,1974) and 
3, .2% p.a. (Lombard and van der Merwe,1972). Taking a 3$p.a. 
growth rate, it is estimated that the de facto pop-
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ulation of KwaZulu at present exceeds 2.5 million. The 
environment in which these people live is 58$ mountain-
ous and about 70% of this is unsuited to crop production 
(Horrell,1973)- Another assessment notes that 13.9% 
of KwaZulu*s total area is suitable dry arable land while 
0.08% is suited to irrigation (Lombard and van der Merwe, 
1972). 
Although it has been suggested tfeat the territory 
of KwaZulu could support a total population of 7.5 million 
(Grobler,1972), it should be noted that this would require 
nothing short of an agricultural revolution. Maasdorp 
(1974) points to the 1970 excess (in terms of carrying 
capacity) of 300,000 cattle units in KwaZulu and the 
related burden on the land so that parts of KwaZulu are 
'...perhaps beyond rehabilitation'(Maasdorp,1976). 
Apparent erosion and overstocking aside, agricultural 
production on arable land is limited in extent and 
efficiency. Less than 80% of KwaZulu's arable land is 
cultivated (Lombard and van der Merwe,1972) and the 
incentives to increase and improve agriculture and 
agricultural productivity are restricted primarily by 
the limited access to capital in KwaZulu (Erwin,1974)• 
Efforts at revising the agricultural sector have 
included planning and investment by state, private white 
enterprise, and KwaZulu authorities. So-called planned 
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areas in KwaZulu are those areas divided into arable 
lands, grazing camps, and residential areas. By the end 
of 1971 46.9% of KwaZulu had been planned in this man-
ner (SAIRR.1973), and by the end of 1975, 49.1% (SAIRR, 
1976). 
The extent of agriculture undertaken specific-
ally for trade and the generation of surplus value is 
limited to 21,331.5ha in sugar cane production (Bantu, 
7,1976), 2,866ha to cotton, and 665ha to coconuts and 
cashew nuts (Anon,1973). The afforested area of KwaZulu 
is 17,069ha (Anon,1973). 
In the early 1950 's, there were 1,453 black sugar 
cane growers on 2,156ha of land, and it was proposed that 
the area given to sugar cane production be increased to 
51,012ha (Union of South Africa,1955). In the 1972/3 
sugar milling season, 2.5% of South Africa's sugar 
production was accounted for by KwaZulu growers. Until 
1972, when the limit was lifted, each 'genuine' cane 
grower qualified for 4ha of land (Bantu,7.1976). In 
contrast, white owned sugar farms are operated on a 
plantation basis with perhaps hundreds of black labour-
ers on each farm. At present, all sugar cane is milled 
by white owned factories located outside KwaZulu. 
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The white-controlled South African sugar industry 
is providing R5 million through the Small Growers 
Financial Aid Fund for the development of 5,000ha of new 
sugar lands to support a population of 30,000 and with 
an envisaged annual revenue of R30 million. Also 
provided by the South African Sugar Association were 
three farmers' centres to the KwaZulu government for 
the education of black sugar farmers (Financial Mail. 
23.5.1976). 
The location of manufacturing industry in or 
abutting KwaZulu is unlikely to offset the underdeveloped 
agricultural sector and generate the capital necessary 
to uplift the welfare of KwaZulu residents, as expected 
by government. 
By the end of 1971, there were an estimated 15 
industries at Hammersdale, 9 at Newcastle, 5 at Lady-
smith, 1 at Richards Bay, and ? at Isithebe (Lombard 
and van der Merwe,1972) designated as potential decentrali 
generators of capital for KwaZulu, as well as providing 
employment for the increasing numbers of black work-
seekers. These industries, all white owned, provided 
direct employment opportunities for- 10,654 blacks, 
including 84 at Isithebe in KwaZulu (Lombard and van 
aer Merwe,1972). Two years later Isithebe had 9 indust-
ries employing 40Q blacks (Financial Mai1,9.11.1973) and 
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Richards Bay had, at the end of 1974, ten industries 
employing 316 blacks (Financial Mail.17.1.1975)• 
Inferences about the spatial distribution of 
wealth in Natal may be drawn from Gross Geographic Product 
data released by government (Republic of South Africa,1968). 
These data are illustrative of economic polarisation in 
urban cores; they reflect the abundance of wealth in 
white agricultural areas; and, they point to the con-
comitant economic deprivation in KwaZulu. However, 
only limited conclusions on the distribution of income 
by racial group may be arrived at as the data are 
aggregated by magisterial district. 
In 1968, 68.9% of Natal»s geographic product was 
accounted for in the magisterial districts of Durban, 
Pinetown, and Pietermaritzburg (see Map No.3). With 
the inclusion of the next most economically productive 
districts of Lower Tugela and Newcastle, 74.2% of 
Natal*s geographic product was accounted for. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the five districts of 
Mapumulo, Ndwedwe, Ingwavuma, Mahlabatini, and Baba-
nango produced 0.2% of the total geographic product. 
Further extrapolation shows the ten most productive 
districts to account for 83.6% of the total geographic 
product while 0.3% is accounted for by the ten least 
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Map 6. 
KwaZulu (1975 Consolidation Proposals) and Gross Geographic Product: 
Ten Magisterial Districts with highest GGP in Natal. 
(Source: R.S.A. (1974) Gross Geographic Product by Magisterial 
District, 1968, Pretoria). 
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productive districts. Maps Number's 5 and 6 illustrate 
the association between geographic product and KwaZulu. 
Spatial patterns of employment are intimately 
related with the pattern of geographic product. Of 
all the blacks employed in Natal, only 5.32$ work in 
the Durban/Pinetown and Pietermaritzburg urban cores. 
The percentage of blacks employed in Natal working in 
white rural areas is 19.8$ (Republic of South Africa, 
1970). Clearly, black employment is not concentrated 
in the most economically productive urban cores and 
those employed in the most productive rural areas are 
mainly labourers on white farms. 
Of all blacks in the common area * 22% are 
employed in the primary sector (white owned farms and 
mines, mainly); 7.4$ in the secondary sector; and 
17.8$ in the tertiary sector. Within KwaZulu, the 
figures tell a different story for there 17.2$ of 
blacks are engaged in the primary sector, in this case 
mainly in sub-subsitence, subsistence, and very limited 
'cash crop' agriculture. Only 3.5$ of KwaZulu blacks are 
employed in the secondary sector and 5.1$ in the tertiary 
sector. The latter figure contrasted with the figure of 
17.8$ of common area blacks in the tertiary sector points 
undoubtedly to the extent of black servant employment and 
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other menial service positions for blacks in white cities, 
enterprises, and homes. 
A clearer breakdown of black employment data 
for Natal is provided : 
BLACK EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL BLACKS IN NATAL 
1970 
Primary Secondary Tertiary Unemployed Unspecified 
Sector Sector Sector £ not eccn. 
active 
KWAZULU 
11.2 2.3 3.3 1.2 47.3 
COMMON AREA 
7.7 2.6 6.2 I.T 17-1 
NATAL TOTAL 
18.9 4.9 9.5 2.3 64.4 
KWAZULU EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF KWAZULU BLACKS 
17.2 3.5 5-1 1.9 72.3 
BLACK EMPLOYMENT IN COMMON AREA AS A PERCENTAGE OF COMMON 
AREA BLACKS 
22.1 ! 7.4 17.8 3.1 49. * 
Table 1. Black Employment in Nat-al 
(Source:Republic of South Afri-a,1970) 
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Of the 64.4$ of Natal's blacks categorised as 
'Unspecified and not economically active', over 70 
are to be found in KwaZulu. This phenomenon must be re-
lated to the exact nature of the South African economy 
which perpetuates the system whereby KwaZulu is 
characterised as a relatively unproductive rural area 
whence comes the male labour in the common area. 
In a recently completed thesis, Nattrass(1976) 
presents her findings on black migrant labour in Natal. 
Deriving her data from the 1970 census, Nattrass(1976) 
estimates the numbers of blacks from rural KwaZulu 
working outside of the 'homeland* to be as follows: 
Table ?. Elack Migrant Labour (Source:Nattrass,1°7^:134 
BLACK MIGRANT LABOUR 
AGE 
15 -
20 -
25 -
30 -
35 -
40 -
45 -
50 -
55 -
KWAZULU, 1970 
19 
24 
29 
34 
39 
44 
49 
54 
64 
FROM 
MALE MIGRANTS 
42,000 
56,000 
56,000 
50,000 
33,000 
35,000 
16,000 
17,000 
12,000 
317,000 
55,000 
472,000 
RURAL 
FEMALE 
t of 
Age Group 
34 
60 
67 
67 
59 
61 
42 
47 
29 
52 
MIGRANTS 
,107, 
137) 
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Extrapolating further, it is estimated that the 
317,000 male migrants earned R132,319,000 and remitted 
R25,103,000 back to KwaZulu (Nattrass, 1976:1.48). These 
remittances accounted for the eauiv»lent of 41% of 
KwaZulu's gross domestic product in 1970 and 142$ of 
its agricultural output (Nattrass,1976:18). Fiscal 
implications of this system for rural dwellers in Kwa-
Zulu in 1970 are such that on the basis of a per capita 
black family of six, it is calculated that a family with 
land and one agricultural worker and one absent migrant 
worker would earn R41 p.a.. A black family with no land 
and one absentee worker would earn R30 p.a., and a 
family with land and no absentees would earn R15 p.a.. 
As a contrast, the average income of an urbanised 
black family would be R124 p.a. (Nattrass,197*:1*5). 
These data lend credence to the simple push-pull 
model of migrant labour postulated by Wilson (1972) and 
display the forces which inhibit economic growth in 
KwaZulu. The skewed masculinity ratio of about 1:3 
for the 19-64 years age cohort of KwaZulu residents 
(Nattrass,1976:179) illustrates that most of the agricul-
tural work in KwaZulu is in the hands of women, who 
provide for the rural family in the absence of males, 
whose remittances are possibly sufficient to offset 
poor agricultural performances in KwaZulu. The higher 
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incomes earned by the urban blacks would most likely be 
spent in the white-owned areas of the economic cores and, 
together, these forces oppose the accumulation of 
capital in KwaZulu. The most recent estimate of per 
capita net domestic product in KwaZulu, which includes 
the white share of approximately 23$ and non-market 
production such as the gathering of firewood, is R53 P-a. 
(Financial Mail.11.6.1976). 
3.8 Summary 
The delimitation of the reserves was a consequence 
of political and economic aspirations among members of 
the white 'conscious collective', that is, the core. 
Limited access by blacks to capital and -their subordination 
on cultural grounds placed them in a-position of societal 
and aconomie peripherality vis-a-vis the core. However, 
the coincidence of space - economic periphery and the 
peripheral social group is not absolute. Penetration 
of white interests into Natal and Zululand involved 
the superimposition of white land-ownership over already 
occupied territory and blacks are therefore distributed 
throughout the province of Natal today. 
Ideological transformations at the core consolidated 
white control over state and capital and the spatial 
impress of the combined demands of state and capital 
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were manifest in spite of protestations by blacks. 
Black employment in the white circuit of the econo-
my binds the entire South African society into a single 
economic system. Segregation of blacks and whites, and 
related patterns of industrial location, enable blacks 
to participate in the industrial sector as workers only. 
Traditional agricultural practices in the 'homelands', 
extensive overstocking and soil erosion, and the dis-
incentive of wage opportunities in the white areas 
perpetuate low agricultural productivity in the 'home-
lands'. The contemporary picture in KwaZulu is a terri-
tory restricted for black occupation only whence comes 
the labour for the white core areas. Capital is spatially 
concentrated in these areas and the only access which 
blacks have to that capital is as wage labourers. Kwa-
Zulu cannot, under these conditions, support its occupants 
without these people being subjects of the white-controlled 
capitalist circuit of production. For the creation of 
employment opportunities inside and outside KwaZulu, and 
for finance capital for any agricultural or industrial 
project, blacks depend on the capitalist circuit of 
production. 
In the next chapter, the proposed manipulation of 
the territorial base of the dependent black internal col-
ony is detailed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TOWARD CONSOLIDATION: 1972 - 1975 
4.1 Introduction 
The origins of the reserves in Natal and Zululand 
were noted in Chapter Three. In this chapter the govern-
ment's proposals partially to consolidate KwaZulu are 
dealt with. The proposals were first officially announced 
during 1972. In 1975 revised proposals were announced. 
Events relating to the announcement of the proposals are 
chronologically accounted in the opening section of 
the chapter (4.2), and in lengthy detail. Thereafter, 
a preliminary analysis of the implications of the 
consolidation proposals is offered (4.3). The reactions 
of whites, with their varying degrees of allegiance to 
the apartheid ideology, are then reviewed (4.4), as 
are those of blacks (4.5). The chapter is then 
briefly summarised (4.6). 
4.2 Government Proposals 
White farmers' associations from the southern 
Natal districts of Richmond, Impedle, Ixopo, Polela, 
Underberg, and Umzinto were the first non-governmental 
group to see details of part of the consolidation plans, 
late in 1971. Early in February, 1972, the Natal 
Agricultural Union (NAU), an organisation representing 
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the white farmers of the province, had its Bantu 
Affairs Committee meet to co-ordinate reports from 
these associations on the issue of land exchanges 
between white farmers and the state, and for the pur-
pose of consolidating KwaZulu. From the outset, the 
NAU provided the intermediary link between white farm-
ers and government, by submitting the proposals of 
each to the other. 
The early revelation of the plans to the NAU 
was acknowledged by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Develop-
ment, Mr. Raubenheimer, who a}.so stated that the NAU 
had submitted counter-proposals for the Drakensberg 
region. Further consultation between his department 
and the NAU was to follow and government was prepared 
to allow the NAU to study the final consolidation plan 
before it was made public (Financial Mail.2.f.1972). 
Indications that the consolidation proposals 
would be publicised during the 1972 Parliamentary 
session were made by Raubenheimer in May of that 
year (Daily News,10.5.1972). Within a week the Natal 
Provincial Council submitted a motion for the incorp-
oration of East Griqualand (Map No. 1) into Natal. 
This move was instigated essentially by the National 
Party members of the Council (Daily News.l* & 23.5.1972). 
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Although thwarted by the Executive Committee of Cape 
Province, the motion reflected a desire on the part of 
some white Natal politicians to consolidate white 
interests and to show solidarity with the whites of 
East Griaualsnd, who might become separated from the 
rest of Cape Province by Transkei. A few days later, 
the NAU also appealed to the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development not to isolate white 
East Griaualanders altogether by surrounding them 
with 'homelands' (Daily News.27.5.1972). This sense 
of protectionism shared by the white Natal politicians 
and agriculturalists stemmed from an insight into the 
yet unannounced consolidation proposals. 
When, in early July 1972, government consoli-
dation proposals for northern Natal were announced, 
reaction was sharper, more widespread, and somewhat 
detached from the concern with the impending isolation 
of white East Griqualanders. The plan to consolidate 
24 blocks and 46 black spots into four areas called for 
a transfer of 530,000h» of white-owned land to Kwa-
Zulu (Daily News.6 &. 7-6.1972). White farmers beg»n 
organising a series of protest meetings. 
Government temporarily appeased the situation 
when, in revealing its proposals for partial consolidation 
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of all of KwaZulu, it announced also that a Bantu Affairs 
Commission would hold public hearings whereby whites 
could air their grievances regarding the consolidation 
issue. KwaZulu would be consolidated into six areas 
totalling 3,364,000ha and, according to government, 
about 88,000 blacks and a few hundred whites would 
face resettlement as 668,000ha of white-owned land was 
exchanged for 554,000ha of black land (see Map No. 7). 
KwaZulu would, under these terms, receive 114,000ha of 
land in addition to the quota of 1936 'because of 
the difference in agricultural values of pasteral 
land involved in the exchanges' (Daily News.12.*.1972). 
While the whites affected by these plans would have the 
limited opportunity of meeting with the Bantu Affairs 
Commission as it toured Natal, the Zulu grievances would 
have to be directed to the Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Development in Pretoria. 
White agriculturalists went ahead and convened 
protest meetings. Southern Natal farmers criticised 
government for not having warned the 30 or so affected 
directly by the plans (Daily News.13.6.1972). At a 
meeting in Dundee more than 100 affected white farmers 
argued that white land should not be given over to 
KwaZulu until the land already occupied by blacks was 
used to its fullest agricultural advantage (Daily News. 
76 
13.6.1972). And Harding residents and local farmers 
arranged to protest over the possible removal of the white 
corridor between East Griqualand and the coast (Daily 
News,14.6.1972) . Sugar cane and citrus farmers in the 
Ntumeni district resolved to oppose the consolidation 
proposals which affected farms with an annual sugar cane 
production of 240,000tons (Daily News.20.*.1972). 
Protestations from various quarters of the 
white community became increasingly alligned with the 
NAU stance, and the Union played a distinctive role 
in its participation at dissentive meetings. The 
NAU president opposed the consolidation plans at a 
combined Boston Farmers Association and Impendle 
Agricultural Society meeting (Daily News.27.7.1972): 
and at a public meeting in Eshowe, where the proposals 
were again rejected, the NAU announced that if its 
views on consolidation were ignored by government it 
would reverse its policy of consultation with govern-
ment (Daily News,19.8.1972). By September 1972, all 
but about one tenth of the white farmers* organisations 
in Natal supported the NAU rejection of government 
proposals (Daily News.l & 4.9.1972). 
Meanwhile, other interest groups were also 
lobbying against the proposals, making counter-proposals, 
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or making recommendations supportive of the proposals. 
The chairman of the South African Wool Grower's Association 
called for a fence to be erected around KwaZulu terri-
tory to prtect white-owned stock - a recommendation 
which the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development refused 
to honour (Daily News.25.7 & 14.11.1972). At an 
Eshowe meeting various white farmers' associations, the 
Eshowe Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the South 
African Sugar Association, and the NAU proposed that 
a strip of land in Reserve 21 be Incorporated into the 
white area so as to widen the white corridor between 
Ginginghlovu and Eshowe. This counter-propos°l would 
include the allocation of compensatory land in Reserve 
11 (proposed as future white land by government) to the 
5,000 affected blacks (Daily News.12.8.1972). The 
Zululand Chamber of Commerce and Industries also 
rejected the official proposals, as did the Dundee Town 
Council (Daily News.17.8.1972). 
Claims by KwaZulu for more land met with a 
firm refusal by the Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Development, Mr. M.C.Botha; and the NAU received a 
negative response from government in its effort to 
delay the sittings of the Bantu Affairs Commission 
(Daily News.8 &. 11.8.1972). The Bantu Affairs Commission 
schedule was for a September 5 hearing at Dundee, a 
hearing at Eshowe the next day, a hearing at Pieter-
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maritzburg on September 7 , and a final hearing at 
Harding later that month. 
At the first session at Dundee, attended by about 
200 people, the chairman of the Commission stated that 
the proposals should not be considered as those of 
government but as coming from the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development. The NAU made an impact 
at the hearings by reiterating the opinions of white 
agriculturalists and proposing that land for KwaZulu should 
be taken from State land (formerly Crown land), and 
not from white farmers (Daily News.5.9.1972). 
The Eshowe session, attended by about 150, was 
characterised by another show of disapproval for the 
plans, and the southern division of the Zululand Chamber 
of Commerce and Industries publicly denounced the pro-
posals (Daily News.6.9.1972). The Eshowe Town Council 
proclaimed that local whites would rather remain in 
a 'white spot* surrounded by black land than conform 
with government proposals (Daily News.7.9.1972). 
The next phase in the procedure
 0f planning for 
consolidation followed the tour of the Bantu Affairs Com-
mission and preceeded the report of its findings to a 
Select Committee on Bantu Affairs. As had occured 
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previously, during this phase intimations regarding 
the 'final' consolidation proposals were made by gov-
ernment officials before the proposals were made public 
in their entirety. 
During March of 1973, Deputy Minister Rauben-
heimer announced that almost all consolidation planning 
had been completed and that the 'final* plans would be 
made available to the 'homeland' leaders before the 
plans were presented to Parliament (Daily News.23.3.1973). 
Days later, on 2f> March, Raubenheimer met with 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Executive Officer of 
KwaZulu, and the KwaZulu Executive Council at Nongoma 
to disclose the new plan which made six blocks of Kwa-
Zulu and required the displacement of about 300,000 
people. The KwaZulu delegation rejected the revised 
plan (Daily News.26.3.1973). 
The leader of the United Party in Natal, Mr. R. 
Cadman, decried the imposition of secrecy about the 
revised consolidation plans (Daily News,27.3.1973: Cad-
man, 1973) , but it was not until April 1973 that Raub-
enheimer released any further information appropos the 
plans. The Deputy Minister revealed that the Umfolozi 
game reserve would, in terms of the revised plan, go to 
KwaZulu (Daily News.11.4.1973) . Immediate reaction to 
this statement came from the South African Council for 
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Conservation and Anti-Pollution, who disapproved of 
the dissection of the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi *ecosystem* 
(Daily News.12.4.1973). Raubenheimer made further 
announcements at a meeting in Cedarville to the effect 
that Harding would, contrary to the 1972 proposals, 
have a corridor link with the Natal south coast (Daily 
News,25.4.1973) . This statement received favourable 
reaction from the NAU (Daily News,27.4.1973). 
Alfred County Farmers* Association president 
approved of the consolidation plans for the Alfred 
district, which provided a corridor outlet from the 
hinterland to the sea and a buffer between KwaZulu and 
Transkei. A division of the NAU was now working to 
have the corridor altered so that the main road inland 
from the coast would not traverse 'homeland* territory 
(Daily News.12.6.1973 ). 
Pronouncements by the Deputy Minister drew a 
retort from the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development who, at a press conference, said that the 
Josini dam and Makatini flats below the dam would go 
to KwaZulu, as would the Ndumu game reserve. Further-
more, less than a third of the Umfolozi game reserve 
would in fact go to KwaZulu. These plans would, 
according to the Minister, imply the displacement of 
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133,000 blacks, an excision of 300,000ha from KwaZulu, 
and an excision of 463,OOOha of white land in land 
transfers (Daily News.27.4.1973)• The NAU expressed 
its satisfaction with these latest recommendations, 
particularly with regard to the cession of the Josini 
dam and Makatini flats to KwaZulu (Daily News.28.4.1973). 
However, white agriculture responded differently 
when it learnt that the two Drakensberg reserves would 
remain in black hands, with additional land added 
thereto. This new information represented, to the 
NAU, a reversal of earlier government assurances. In 
1964, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Develop-
ment had agreed, in principle, to the transfer of the 
two reserves to white control on the condition that 
the NAU could find compensatory land for the blacks who 
would have to be displaced. The NAU h°d duly traced 
white farmers in the Weenen, Colenso, and Kranskop areas 
from whom such land might be bought. It was argued by 
the NAU that their concern for the Drakensberg was not 
a political concern but related rather to the incapabil-
ity of KwaZulu to conserve the Tugela catchment area 
(Daily News.3.5.1973). 
The reaction of white farmers in the Drakensberg 
area motivated the NAU to send a delegation to Cape 
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Town to put their case before the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Bantu Affairs on 9th May, 1973. The 
Select Committee refused to hear the evidence of the 
NAU (Daily News.5.5.1973). 
Farmers in the Gourton area, near Winterton, 
also dismayed by the ministerial disclosures, were 
represented by their association chairman when he stated 
that *At no stage could farmers be less prepared 
for disaster than the Gourton farmers who have 
been told for years by organised agriculture 
and from ministerial level that this area 
would never become a Bantustan as it is the 
watershed of the Tugela* (Daily News.3.5.1973). The 
whites in Ingwavuma district and the Winterton and Berg-
ville area farmers also protested, the latter group 
castigating government for the fact that they only learnt 
of the proposals, which affected them directly, in-
directly through the media (Daily News.4 & 5.5.1973). 
Raubenheimer indicated that he supported the 
NAU opinion regarding the undesirability of having blacks 
remain in the Tugela catchment area. However, the NAU 
suggestion of moving blacks from the catchment area to 
the Makatini flats raised a problem, for this group of 
people had tribal links with the people of the Makatini 
flats (Daily News,6.10.1973)* 
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Raubenheimer showed further accomodation for 
the NAU when he spoke to its delegates in Pretoria. NAU 
demands that white farms be bought by government on a 
block-basis, wherever this was possible, were acceded 
to by Raubenheimer. He also assured the NAU delegation 
that consolidation would be completed within ten years 
of the promulgation of the consolidation plans (Daily 
News.28.11.1973). 
At a closed meeting of nine farmers* associations 
in the Estcourt, Winterton, and Bergville areas, the 
provincial plans for the deproclamation of the Upper 
Tugela reserve and the linking of the two Drakensberg 
reserves were released. Ninety per cent of the 
farm owners rejected the plans and a committee was 
elected to represent the approximately thirty affected 
white farmers in opposing the plans before 18 January, 
1974, the deadline before which opposition was to be 
heard (Daily News.12 & 14.12.1973). 
Early in January, 1974, parts of Natal owned 
by whites in the Durban, Lower Umfclozi, and Eshowe 
magisterial districts were declared released areas 
available for purchase by the Bantu Trust (Daily News. 
11.1.1974). 
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In March, 1974, Raubenheimer- announced that the 
KwaZulu consolidation plans were still incomplete, with 
the future of the controversial flats undecided. He also 
suggested that the future of Eshowe as a white town was 
in the balance (Daily News.20.3.1974). The resultant 
upcry drew a comment from Prof. O.P.F.Horwood, the Min-
ister of Indian Affairs and Tourism, that Eshowe would 
remain a white town (Daily News.28.3.1974). Neverthe-
less, a deputation from the Eshowe Town Council went 
to Pretoria where they received Raubenheimer's assurance 
on their continuing control of Eshowe (Daily News.9.4.1974). 
At the end of March, 1975, the consolidation 
proposals were disclosed in part in the media and on 
2 May, 1975, the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Bantu Affairs had its proposals approved in the House 
of Assembly (see Map lio. 7). 
4 «3 Behind and Beyond the Consolidation Plans 
Parliamentary procedure shadowing the develop-
ments discussed above began with the establishment of 
Bantu Affairs Commission whose plans for consolidation 
were examined and revised by a Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Bantu Affairs (Republic of South Africa, 
1975). Some of the revised plans received parliament-
ary approval in 1973 and, after amendments, the rest of 
the proposals were approved and adopted in 1975. 
85 
SWAZILAND 
Lodysmi * 
LESOTHO 
mmersdaU 
JO urban 
0 
< _ 
ichards Bay 
50 
N 
Kilometres 
J5° 
z 
MAP 7. KwaZulu: 1975 Consolidation Proposals 
86 
Debated at length in Parliament, the consolidation 
issue magnified existing cleavages between the three white 
political parties represent i in Parliament at the time. 
In mid-May, 1975, when the final reports were being 
considered, government policy on land allocation was 
reiteraw .d in respect of the 1936 quotas. Reaction 
from opposition benches was strong, and reference to 
the 1936 Act was a point of contention for it was seen 
to be utilised merely to rationalise apartheid (Hansard. 
May 1975; 4 &. 5.6.1975). 
It was revealed in Parliament that the Select 
Committee based its reports on the un-recorded evidence 
of the Bantu Affairs Commission. Furthermore, at no 
stage were the victims of the removals (blacks), which 
would ensue from consolidation, ever consulted. Leaders 
of the *homeland' administrative bodies were consulted 
only on an ad hoc basis by a few of the members of 
the Select Committee, belonging to the opposition 
United Party (Hansard.14.5.1975; 4&5.6.1975). 
The economic and social ramifications of the 
Parliamentarily-approved recommendations of the Select 
Committee (Republic of South Africa, 1975) demand 
some attention. In the first instance, the proposals 
organise white territory so as to provide for an 
almost completely integrated area with accessibility among 
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p-->rts and cities in Natal and the hinterland provinces 
of Transvaal and Orange Free State. A white corridor 
extending northward from Durban links this city with 
Richards Bay, whence extend corridors to Swaziland in the 
north and Transvaal in the north-west. The Richards 
Bay - Vryheid passage is significant in the light of 
Richards Bay*s development as a port. Although the 
major rail and road routes between these two towns 
will pass through KwaZulu, at Ulundi, the Richards Bay 
site will be conveniently linked with the Witwaters-
rand by a white passage. The white town of Eshowe is 
accorded access to this passage in the most recent 
proposals. Eastward from Dturban, the arterial trans-
portation route to the Witwatersrand is also straddled 
by white territory, as it passes via Pietermaritzburg 
and the northern Natal industrial complexes at Ladysmith 
ar.d Newcastle (Republic of South Africa, 1975). 
Social disruption in consequence of the imple-
mentation of the plans would be characterised by the 
resettlement of hundreds of thousands of blacks. 
Resettlement has received some attention in the literature 
(Desmond,1971; Baldwin,1975). Thus far, most resettle-
ment has involved the removal of blacks from black spots 
to 'homeland* areas. The scale of resettlement would be 
augmented by the excision of larger reserves from Kwa-
Zulu in efforts at consolidation. Furthermore, the 
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proposed elimination of the labour tenant system, 
which has survived since colonial times, would affect 
an estimated 400,000 blacks (Horrell,1973). 
Selection of land in providing for additional 
territory and alternative territory to that excised 
from KwaZulu favoured the granting to KwaZulu of State 
land before white farmlands. This is noted in respect 
of the Makatini flats (including the Ndumu game reserve), 
and the Ngoya and Nkandla forest reserves. Towns now 
embraced by KwaZulu would be Impendle, Hlabisa, Nongoma, 
Ubombo, Ingwavuma, and Pomeroy, all minor service 
centres. 
Territory excised from KwaZulu included the 
Upper Tugela reserves in the Bergville district and 
only small portions of the Drakensberg reserves con-
tested by the NAU. A more detailed perspective on the 
implications of the proposals is furnished in the next 
chapter. 
4.4 Consolidation and the Core 
Critiques of the consolidation proposals have 
come from various quarters at the core. Beside crit-
icism from persons closely allied with the ruling 
party in South Africa, opposition has come too from 
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other influential parties such as organised white 
agriculture in Natal. Commenting on consolidation, the 
NAU raised the following question : 'Can anyone 
seriously envisage the effects of, say 1,000 
white Natal farmers, walking off highly capitalised, 
developed farms, with their knowledge, expert-
ise and capital so that this land can be handed 
over to peasant farmers to practice subsistence 
farming, under communal land ownership?' (NAUNT.U. Nov, 19°*). 
The English-language press, reputed for its 
constant attacks on the current regime, has taken issue 
with government over the consolidation proposals. 
Two examples of editorial stances on the "proposals follow. 
One Durban daily argued that 'V-hite and Black 
have always, and will always, be utterly 
dependent on each other. Drawing lines on the 
map won't change that. The wealthy and the 
impoverished have never been good neighbours 
and the geographical nightmare which has now 
been concocted will perpetuate the stark 
difference. It holds the recipe for future 
friction, discontent and bitterness' (Daily News. 
30.4.1973). 
The other Durban daily perceived the proposals 
in a similar light : 'Experience has shown that 
few things are as un-final as the Government's 
protracted series of "final" proposals for 
the consolidation of KwaZulu - or to be more 
accurate, the fragmentation of Natal...the only 
sensible course (failing an "entirely new geo-
political dispensation") is to start planning 
the whole province on the assumption that its 
various regions are going to function as a 
single economic unit, whatever the ultimate 
political configuration' (Natal Mercury.1.4.1975). 
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Within South Africa's party-political structure, 
the two major parties representing opponents of govern-
ment among the all-white electorate in 1975 both pro-
posed federal solutions to South Africa's territorial 
ailemma. The United Party stood for a race federation 
which would ensure white supremacy but not be based 
necessarily on territorial segregation. The Progressive 
Party solution would be based on a qualified franchise 
system for voters. Essentially, both parties rejected 
the consolidation proposals as irrelevant to their pol-
icies for they both rejected the idea of sovereign 
states being established within South Africa. 
A number of academics have been involved in 
the debate too (Rest and Young,1972b;de Glercqjl973; 
Maasdorp,1976; Blenck and von der Ropp,197*). These 
involvements have not gone unnoticed by parliamentarians, 
particularly the analysis of alternative consolidation 
strategies made by Best and Young(1972b)which received 
mention in a House of Assembly debate (Hansard.5.6.1973). 
de Clercq(1973) extends the former analysis and Maasdorp 
(1976) argues for more land to be given to KwaZulu. The 
paper by Blenck and von der Ropp(197*) represents an 
insensitive analysis of the situation, reminiscent of 
missionary strategy during the infusion of western Euro-
pean ideology into the colonial empires. 
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The critiques of four core elites sympathetic 
to apartheid are now discussed. Any action by govern-
ment in relation to the spatial organisation of 
economy and society must be closely monitored, and 
these influential critiques should not be ignored, 
future policy under this or another regime will be 
based upon the emergent patterns in the South African 
space economy which are rooted in the ideologies of 
the core. 
The South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA), 
an organisation of Afrikaner intellectuals and academics, 
has had an intimate association with the development 
of apartheid. Contributions to its periodical publications 
epitomise apartheid ideology and the SABRA is also 
active in promoting cultural awareness among white, 
predominantly Afrikaner, youth by organising youth 
camps and the like. 
One paper read before the SABRA 1976 annual 
convention received wide publicity in the South African 
media, including mention in a news broadcast of the 
recently installed SABC TV network. The paper, presented 
by Bruinette(1976), dealt with the question of consol-
idation in the broader context of the implementation 
of apartheid, and its salient features are notable. 
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Bruinette(1976) traces the precedents of the 
current stage of apartheid and justifies its existence 
in his observation that the western-capitalist-democratic 
model is ideal for whites, who have been acquainted 
with it for centuries, while blacks have only known it 
for decades. That is, argues Bruinette(1976), a pol-
itical model for blacks which has stood the test of 
time is unknown in moderb times and without major 
modifications the existing white model seems not to be 
the relevant alternative for blacks. 
According to Bruinette(1976), the political 
system in South Africa makes for a state with more 
foreigners (i.e. blacks) than 'South Africans'. Coupling 
this phenomenon with the idea that the present pattern 
of minority versus majority in the country is unprecedented 
in history, the current political model can only be 
accepted by Bruinette(197£) as a non-permanent, trans-
itory phase. A twenty-year task of border redefinition, 
population removals and resettlements, and great 
economic cost will provide the basis for the ultimate 
phase, where the majority of 'South Africans' will be 
white. 
To this end, he argued, the governmental con-
solidation proposals are unsatisfactory, from the 
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perspective of defense and b*»eatise of the multitude 
of corridors and fragmented tracts of white land. 
The solution lies for him in the delimitation of four 
territorial blocks which would accomodate blacks and 
thereby leave South Africa a white domain, while 
allowing blacks to develop their own nations. KwaZulu 
would constitute a block in this scheme, along with 
the Ciskei-Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and North East 
Transvaal blocks. 
Implications of the scheme include, inter alia, 
the withdrawal of the 1936 Act, the transaction of land 
between white and black on an exchange basis, the provision 
for existing landowners to retain propriety over land 
and become citizens of another state as prescribed by 
border changes, the condition that all land not exchanged 
on a mutual basis must be paid for by the respective 
states even if it takes the 'homelands' a long time to 
do so, and, the necessity of expert management to study 
and monitor the interventionism required to implement 
the scheme (the SABRA has a committee to do this), 
To facilitate commuting by blacks to white urban 
centres, suggests Bruinette(1976), the existing 'home-
lands' need to be expanded in the direction of these 
centres. Blacks working in the white cities should be 
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subjected to the obtaining system of discrimination in 
employment. Furthermore, ethnic integration among 
blacks is to be prevented by allocating different tribal 
groupings to different work zones (e.g. Zulus should 
work only in Natal). This is important for Bruinette(1976) 
because he holds that integration disintegrates the 
roots of national identity and culture, and a black mass 
is cultivated, without any cohesive national identity and 
without the security necessary for peaceful evolution. 
The KwaZulu block, maintains Bruinette(1976), 
should be in northern Natal and consolidated so as 
to join Swaziland and the Swazi 'homeland*. Ilammersdale 
and Umlazi present problems for him and blacks should 
be moved about 20km north to be in KwaZulu. Newcastle 
is seen to be ideally located and the part of KwaZulu 
near there could be consolidated eastward to adjoin 
the rest of KwaZulu. Richards Bay and northern Natal 
will ultimately fall within KwaZulu and the areas of 
the *homeland* now between the Durban - Pietermaritzburg -
Newcastle line and Transkei must be exchanged for that 
land. 
The exigencies of the dynamic state of race rela-
tions in South Africa and the concern for the preservation 
of cultural exclusivity at the white core are clear 
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instigators of the above critique, symbolising as it 
does the basic tenets of apartheid ideology. In the next 
critique similar concerns, although perhaps slightly 
less evident, are compounded by concern for the 
preservation of a capitalist mode of production in 
South Africa. 
The stated aim of the Bantu Investment Corp-
oration is *...to bring about, maintain and further 
economic viability in the Homelands* (Bantu Investment 
Corporation,1976:3 ). Engaged as it is in fostering 
investment in the *homelands*, the BIC constitutes the 
primary instrument for the rationalisation of apartheid 
on economic grounds. 
Speaking at a recent meeting of the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce in Port Elizabeth, the chairman 
of the BIC board of directors addressed the issue of 
political and economic decentralisation in South Africa. 
Viljoen(1976) emphasises that his speech is a personal 
rather than an official statement. This declaration 
cannot but reinforce the need to heed his opinions, 
which are critical of political structures in South 
Africa as well as of government*s consolidation proposals 
for the 'homelands*. The speech by Viljoen(197*) 
represents another voice of dissent among the elite 
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proponents of apartheid. 
Observations made by Viljoen(197*) at the 
outset of his talk relate to the ideal of maintaining 
in South Africa a 'favourable investment climate' for 
the realisation of South Africa's full economic potential. 
Internal strife could interfere with the attainment of 
this ideal and 'evolutionary outlets* must be provided 
to obviate conflict. That is, non-whites, who will 
constitute an increasingly large proportion of the 
country*s population, with corresponding increases in 
their urbanisation and participation in industrialisation, 
'...will become better educated and more conscious of 
their place and role in our society' (Viljoen,1976). 
These people will have to be provided with employment 
opportunities and rates of pay commensurate with their 
abilities and they should have an increasing share in 
governmental decision-making, within a federal structure 
of government. 
Viljoen(1976) sees three impediments to the 
actualisation of decentralisation in the 'homelands* : 
The problem of activating blacks *...to become a profit-
orientated society so that it can run a modern sophis-
ticated economy...*(Viljoen,1976) over a short period; 
the faot that most of the income of the *homelands * is 
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earned by migrant workers; and, the fragmentation of 
the *homelands'. 
Following Malherbe( 1974 )"', Viljoen(197* ) pro-
poses the consolidation of KwaZulu between the Tugela 
and Pongola rivers. However, Richards Bay would not 
go to the state of KwaZulu. Instead, Viljoen(197*) 
advocates the establishment of a condominium over 
Richards Bay and Empangeni by KwaZulu, Natal Province 
(which would no doubt have a white government), and the 
central (federal) government. The Richards Bay-Empangeni 
complex would become a demilitarised zone so that none 
of the above governments could use Richards Bay to 
import or export arms and troops. 
Another viewpoint is held by a former member 
of the Tomlinson Commission, Moolman(1974;1975), who 
is now a member of the Africa Institute , an ostensibly 
impartial research organisation. Moolman(1974), 
speaking at a South African Institute of Race Relations 
annual council meeting, presented his view as a solution 
(to the territorial problem in South Africa) somewhere 
between the SABRA and SAIRR policies. Moolman(1974; 
1975) demonstrates how blacks have not experienced the 
same degree of political, ethnic, economic, and territorial 
consolidation as whites have. It is not until these 
(* reviewed by Young{1975)). 
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interests are realised among blacks that consolidation 
can be said to be effective. 
Just as in the previous critiaues, Moolman(1974; 
1975) is only seeking an alternative within the apartheid 
structure. All three of the above critiques call in 
fact for the drawing together of the existing peripheral 
group within a unified territorial base. 
Taking *homeland* policy for granted, Dr. L.Mc-
Crystal, an economist preparing a *development* plan 
for KwaZulu, claims that 'We have a chance here 
to demonstrate how the development of under-
developed areas can be promoted to the benefit 
of the entire community both developed and 
underdeveloped' (South African Digest.25.3.1977). 
Advocating a capital investment of R400 million in the 
next seven years and the development of a transportation 
infrastructure to connect the parts of KwaZulu, McCrystal 
sees the remedy to the problems cf KwaZulu in achieving 
a growth in KwaZulu's geographic product of 10% at 
constant prices (South African Digest.25.3.1977). 
4 .5 Consolidation and the Periphery 
This section deals with black reaction tc 
the spatial impact of state and capital in Natal between 
197? and 1975. It should be noted that the ouestion 
of land-claims is considered in Chapter * as beinf 
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ciccndary to the greater problem of internal cclorialism 
in South Africa. 
Most recent land-claims came from office bearers 
of the KwaZulu executive Council at the time cr the 
announcement of the consolidation plans. These people 
are not regarded by all blacks a<b leaders, it should 
be remembered. Buthelezi, the officially recognised 
I-waZulu leader, has been dubbed in the past as a 
reactirrTy misleader of blacks (Daily News, 12.7.1973 ). 
This statement frcm the Black Peoples' Convention is 
not an uncommon one ascribed to black administrators in 
KvaZulu. Nevertheless, their views are significant 
for, at the time of the consolidation proposal 
announcements they were the only blacks to become 
imbued in the land debate. (3-e Append" iv -.) 
Apartheid and the consolidation proposals came 
under heavy attack by Puthelezi and other members of 
his government. Also, the proposed removals of blacks 
drev; angry comment from other blacks in KwaZulu. Puth-
elezi has stated, for example, that 'Any solution 
worked out by whites on their own will never give us 
satisfaction' (Daily News.2.3.1973) and that 'The 
urban areas are blossoming because of the brawn 
of the Black man. Now that the time has come 
for the tree we have tended together to blossom, 
they want to claim it for themselves. This is 
why they hold pseudo-independence before our 
eyes' (Daily News.12.3.1973). 
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On the question of consolidation, Buthelezi 
has repeatedly asked Prime Minister Vorster for more 
land to be added to KwaZulu (SAIRR,197*; Daily News. 
23.1.1975)and the KwaZulu government has also laid 
claim to Richards Pay, all the Zululand nme reserves, 
and State land in Zululand north of the Tugela river 
(Daily News,17.1.1973) and the Zululand coast and 
territorial waters (Daily News.25.3.1974). 
The issue of resettlement has drawn particu-
larly sharp commentary from blacks. Mr. B.Dladla, 
the KwaZulu Executive Councillor of Community Affairs, 
announced that only the barrel of a gun would mo\e 
blacks from the Drakensberg and Tugela reserves (Daily 
News,*.6.1973), and chiefs and headmen in the Drakens-
berg reserves have stated also that they would refuse 
to move even under penalty of death (Daily News.#.*.1973). 
More recently, Buthelezi has directed his 
attention to the question of black subjugation in gen-
eral rather than to the land question. He has received 
wide publicity for- a number of public speeches in the 
past twc vears in which he criticised the apartheid 
regime. Calling for an elimination of apartheid and 
for the establishment of multi-racial government in 
South Africa, Buthelezi stated at a meeting with white 
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politicians that 'The choice for South Africa is clear -
abandon apartheid or forego the co-operation of 
blacks' (Natal Mercury.6.12.1976). 
Buthelezi has also recently conferred with 
other 'homeland' leaders and a ioint statement was 
irsued to the white central government. A resolution 
therefrom follows : 'The leaders here assembled, 
excluding Bophutatswana and the Transkei, 
wish to reiterate that they have no intention 
whatsoever of opting for the so-called independ-
ence, as we do not want-t© abdicate our birth-
right as South Africans, as well as forfeiting 
our share of the economy and wealth, which we 
have jointly built' (Africa Report.Sep-OctrlQ7*)« 
The core is taking increasing notice of such 
statements for the threat to its si rvival (and it is 
a growing threat) has perhaps never been as great as 
in the last year. 
4-6 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the spatial impact 
of state ard capital in Natal becween 1972 and 197r 
and has pointed to white critiques thereof and to the 
voices of black opposition oc th3 consolidation pla^s. 
At the core thera is dissatisfaction *--"th "he 
consolidation proposals. However, the most potentially 
influential opponents do not question the notions of 
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*homeland' development or segregation of th^ races. 
Their concern is with the methods of segregation, 
and their counter-proposals will not go unheeded by 
government. 
Confusion surrounding the announcement of the 
consolidation proposals heightened ci'iticism from the 
whites most immediately affected by tbe plans. A 
marked susceptibility by government to the com^ent^ 
cf white owners of capital is recognisable throughout 
the 1972 - 1975 period. 
Black reaction to the consolidation proposals 
was at first extremely critical. The relationship 
between the periphery and the core has become increas-
ingly strained and blacks are now placing more 
emphasis on the socio-political structure of internal 
colonialism than en its territorial base. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONSOLIDATION IN THE BALANCE 
5 .1 Introduction 
Apartheid in general, and the consolidation pro-
posals in particular, have wrought, or may give rise to, 
a scheme of things which have thus far in this dissertation 
been described in mainly non-evaluative terms. In this 
chapter a selection of problems associated with the 
methods of apartheid under study are pinpointed and an 
evaluation of each is advanced. Initially, the implications 
of the consolidation plans for population removals are 
considered (5.2). The next area of concern is the pattern 
of urbanisation of blacks in Natal and industrial sation, 
as they relate to state planning(5.3). Two location-
specific problems are then identified. Richards Bay 
is considered in view of its envisaged development as 
a port (5.4), and the rationale behind land allocation 
in the Tongaland region (Ingwavuma district) is questioned 
(5.5). The concluding section (5-6) summarises the 
chapter. 
5 .2 Consolidation and Removals 
KwaZulu's territorial consolidation will be 
accompanied by mass removals of people from areas de-
proclaimed for their ethnic or racial group. Desmond 
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(1971) has detailed the mental and physical impact of 
the removals upon the black victims in a provocative 
work emanating from years of intimate familiarity with 
*the discarded people' (as he calls them) encumbered by 
resettlement. The anguish of being uprooted in comp-
liance with policies devised solely by the white core 
is, for blacks, the most glaring and alarming social 
consequence of the issue of *homeland* consolidation. 
The process of resettlement has been going on 
since the delimitation of the first reserves in Natal. 
de Clercq (1973) suggests that approximately #00,000 
blacks were relocated in reserves in colonial Natal. 
Since 1.94& momentum has gathered and resettlement has 
embraced a broader spectrum of the population. In 
terms of present policy, not only blacks are being 
removed, but also members of other groups. Further-
more, the nature of black resettlement has taken on 
larger proportions with the official attempts at 
eliminating black spots and with the outlawing of 
labour tenants and squatters on white farms. 
It is estimated that in 194# there were ?42 
black spots in Natal, carrying a population of *7,100, 
and that by 1964 there were 199 black spots with 
35,200 black occupants (Maasdorp,1970). The largest 
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complex of resettlement areas absorbing resettled 
blacks in the 1960*s and early 1970's was in the Tugela 
Basin between Dundee and Weenen (Maasdorp,1970). 
By the beginning of 1972 there remained more 
than 100 black spots in Natal (Financial Mail.21.1.1972). 
During 1972, about 225 families were moved from a 
farm (black spot) near Waschbank to Ekuvukeni in the 
Limehill area, about 29km away (SAIRR,.1973)- M«re 
than 400 black families from Hobsland and Vulandondo 
were removed to Ezakheni, those from Hobsland having 
been resettled there in 19*3 and promised permanancy of 
residence (SAIRR,1973). The 1972 consolidation 
proposals placed the resettlement figures at approx-
imately 343,000 blacks, £,4#0 Indians, 1,060 Coloureds, 
and 6,160 whites in Natal (Young,B.S., quoted in Daily 
News.5.6.1973). 
A recent estimate, which includes all forms of 
displacement, has it that 105,000 blacks will ultimately 
be moved in Natal (Baldwin,1975). 
5.3 Regional Policy. Urbanisation, and Industrialisation 
What one pair of writers expose in South Africa 
as a case of 'contained urbanisation' (Fair and Schmidt, 
1974), another pair refer to as 'a mechanically strange 
regional policy' (Mabin and Biesheuvel,1975), Regional 
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policy in South Africa is dictated by anartheid ideology 
and revolves around the linked issues of 'contained 
urbanisation' and industrial decentralisation. As 
originally rationalised by Dr. H.F.Verwoerd (cf 3.4), 
regional policy strives to restrict the flow of blacks 
to existinu cities and, by means of incentives, to 
encourage manufacturing industry, which is mostly 
privately owned, to locate adjacent to or inside the 
'homelands'. 
The constraints upon black urbanisation, 
namely '...the myriad regulations commonly referred to 
as "the pass laws" (by which) legal residence or con-
tinuous employment for specified periods, or since birth, 
in the relevant city or town' (Mabin and Biesheuvel,1975), 
are incompatible with the pressure of negligible 
opportunities for wage-employment in the 'homelands' and 
demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the 
industrial centres. The attempted enticement cf 
private industry to locate in the 'homelands' is not 
as successful as necessary to counter the impulses 
behind labour migrancy. Far more successful has been 
the removal of blacks from certain areas and the man-
ipulation of borders so as to bring parts of the 'home-
lands' within commuting distance of industrial centres 
in white-owned territory, which have or have net been 
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proclaimed as zones for decentralised industry. 
In any study of urbanisation in South Africa, 
twc types of urban area need to be recognised. On the 
one hand thare is urbanisation in the cities which 
existed before active decentralisation policies were 
pursued by government, and on the other hand are the 
emergent industrial centres which are manifestations of 
decentralisation policy or which are new cities desig-
nated as decentralised areas. In the case of Natal, 
Durban and Newcastle may be taken as representatives 
of the first mentioned class of city, while Isithebe, 
Hammersdale, and Richards Bay might be subsumed under the 
latter class. 
The drawing of the above distinction calls for 
a diversion into the taxonomy of planning. The concepts 
growth centre and growth pole have been distinguished 
in terms of a hierarchy of central places (Allen and 
Hermansen,1968*; Misra,1969; Fair; 1973); or as regions 
in geographic space or as loci in abstract economic 
space (Hermansen,1972; Campbell,1974). Elsewhere, 
growth poles have been conceptualised as regional 
development planning tools (Thomas,1972); hypotheses 
(Parr,19*5); or theories (Misra,1969) - in the last case 
assuming predictive and explanatory powers. Campbell 
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(1974) offers simplification by proposing that '...the 
term growth pole hould be confined to polar-
ization nd growth processes in ecoromic space, 
and the term growth center should be confined 
to concentration and growth processes in geographic 
space' (Campbell,1974). 
Ambiguities in the theory surrounding the 
concepts are magnified by official nomenclature in 
South Africa. The South African National Physical 
Development Plan (Republic of South Africa,1975 h ) 
defines growth poles as '...towns cr complexes of 
towns which will, without much stimulus, com-
mand sufficient growth potential to develop 
and support a large population. These poles 
should be far enough from existing metropolitan 
areas to develop into independent cities in 
the future' (Republic of South Africa,1975 b:l#). 
State planning also fosters 'growth points' within or 
in close proximity to the 'homelands'. 
The Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg complex is 
classified as one of four metropolitan areas by the 
National Physical Development Plan (Republic of South 
Africa,1975 b ). Planning within that area, the 
Natal To wn and Regional Planning Commission (NTRPC) 
enumerate the 1970 population thereof as almost two 
million of Natal's four and a quarter million total 
population (NTRPC,1973). Metropolitan Durban alone 
had a population of over 900,000 in 19**, of whom 
over one third were blacks (NTRPC,1973). Projections 
suggest that the proportion of blacks will increase 
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given the present rates of growth and migration. 
DURBAN : POPULATION FORECAST 
1966 1980 1990 
Whites 250,390 
Asians &, Coloureds335 ,278 
Blacks 
TOTAL 
350,024 
935,692 
384,900 
528,400 
509,930 
1,423,230 
527,700 
705,300 
729,180 
1,9*2,180 
Ta':le 3. Durban : Population Forecast 
(Source:WTRrC,1973 Appendix 2, Table h) 
A similar projection of employment numbers suggests that 
by 1990 almost one half of the envisaged 935,851 people 
employed in Durban will be blacks (NTRPC,1973). 
The extent and dynamics of black participation 
in the regional economy of the Durban-Pinetown-Pieter-
maritzburg area point to the inextricability of black 
and white in the economic sphere. Industrial concentration 
about the port of Durban and associated tertiary develop-
ment requires a concentration of workers and a dilemma 
arises for the segregationist government. Blacks are 
vital to the capitalist circuit of production, yet the 
need is seen to separate them from their places of 
work by a distance commensurate with the dictates of 
apartheid. 
Umlazi and KwaMashu, black residential areas 
within the Durban-Pinetown metropolis, have been 
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incorporated into KwaZulu, the former having been one of 
the colonial reserves and the latter by border manipulation. 
Likewise, in the case of Newcastle decentralisation 
planning took into account local industrial expansion, 
particularly the erection of the third fully integrated 
steelworks in South Africa. Madadeni township for 
blackp is adjacent to Newcastle's industrial area and 
Osizweni is being developed 7.4km east of Madadeni 
(Newcastle Municipality,n.d.). 
Sundumbili is the only residential area desig-
nated for black workers in decentralised industries 
in KwaZulu, at Isithebe. Other black townships in 
areas of industrial decentralisation are Empumalangst, 
near Hammersdale, and Ezikhaweni, near Richards Bay. 
Being outside KwaZulu, Hammersdale and Richards Bay 
serve only as employment sources for blacks and duplicate 
therefore the state of affairs in Durban and Newcastle, 
where maximum capital investment occurs in the white 
zones of the urban-industrial areas and thus where 
returns to capital are directed. 
Strong appeals have been made by the BIC to 
foreign investors to locate plants in the 'homelands*. 
The participation of trans-national corporations in 
the development of SouthAfrica*s capitalist circuit of 
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production based on black labour notwithstanding, 
certain foreign investors have been attracted to 
KwaZulu1. The indirect shareholdings of British 
investors in Isithebe firms (Financial Mail,12.7.1974) 
and the decision of a Swiss industrialist to establish 
a Rl million plant in KwaZulu (SAIRR,1974) are noteworthy. 
Also of interest is the investment of Bata Shoe Company 
in two KwaZulu plants. A R2 million factory to be 
opened near Estcourt in 1978 will bring the Bata invest-
ment to R3 million. The existing Bata factory at 
Keates Drift near Greytown employs 230 Zulus (Natal 
Mercury.12.11.1976). KwaZulu may well attract further 
foreign capitalists which would steer returns to capital 
directly out of South Africa, rather than having the 
social product polarise in the South African cities. 
That is, the structure of the dependency of the black 
internal colony would face transformation but not 
destruction. 
It is apparent that black urbanisation focuses 
on the major urban-industrial cores, and government's 
vision of industrial decentralisation as a means cf 
constraining the influx of blacks in the larger cities 
remains unrealised (Fair and Davies, 1976). Growth pole 
or growth centre theory may be applied to the ends of 
social justice by decentralising industry (Santos, 
1975 a ). However, industrial decentralisation in 
112 
South Africa works to the ultimate benefit of the 
white core and foreign investors because the industries 
involved are dominated by interests at the core. 
Should KwaZulu become * independent', its 
administrators would find it difficult to restrain 
urbanisation, in the event that they revoked all the 
laws currently inhibiting black mobility. As it is, 
Maasdorp(1975) estimates the number of squatters to be 
about a quarter million in the Durban area alone . An 
obvious solution to the problem, it would seem, would 
be to encourage exactly the type of decentralisation 
that government is now trying to promote. This would 
run contrary to the suggestions made by Young(1972) 
and Maasdorp(1974) for industrial development to be 
initiated in KwaZulu at locations adjoining the 
existing industrial areas. 
In the final analysis, it may be said that the 
maintenance of the urban-industrial cores and their 
contributions to the successful functioning of the 
capitalist circuit of production in South Africa (and 
in its international setting) rely absolutely on 
black labour. Any decentralisation attempts and even 
the question of an 'independent' KwaZulu need to be 
weighed against this fact. Solutions to the problem of 
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black urbanisation and industrial decentralisation rest 
in the relationship between workers and industry. Equity 
in terms of opportunity and mobility among all particip-
ants in the South African economy is a precondition 
for the solution of these problems. Another precon-
dition relates to the control of capital flows within 
the economy, both locally and internationally. Industrial 
decentralisation is a meaningless task until these 
issues are addressed and settled. 
5.4 Consolidation and Richards Bay(see Map No.S ) 
Selected by central government as the site 
for a deep-water port in 1965 (Financial Mail.31.7.1970). 
Richards Bay is being transformed from a nature reserve 
and fishing resort into a harbour city which is to 
perform various functions within the South African 
space economy and within the framework of international 
patterns of trade. The port was opened to limited 
shipping traffic in April,1976, with the primary 
purpose of serving as a point of trans-shipment for 
the bulk exportation of coal and, later, other bulk 
cargo such as sugar. 
The port and its corresponding city are planned 
to fulfil national and international economic impera-
tives rather than cater for clearly discernable social 
needs. This accords with the trend in the evolution 
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of other cities in South Africa (cf Anderson,1958), 
namely the almost invariable association of industrial 
concentration and urban growth with natural resource 
location (An exception would be the creation of a new 
town primarily to fulfil political imperatives; e.g. 
Ulundi - cf Best and Young, 1972 a ). 
Besides offering deep-water port facilities 
and alleviating traffic at Durban, presently the main 
port serving Natal and parts of the Witwatersrand, 
Richards Bay will act as an industrial growth point 
drawing labour from KwaZulu (Republic of South Africa, 
1972). At the national level then, Richards Bay is 
planned as a metropolitan port and point of origin for 
a 'development axis' to the Witbank/Middleburg coal-
mining and industrial complex in the Transvaal (Republic 
of South Africa,1975 b ). 
At the local level, urban planning for the new 
city progresses according to the master plan drawn by 
a private firm, Thorringtcn-Smith, Rosenberg, and 
McCrystal, at the behest of government. Government has 
exercised maximum possible control over developments 
at Richards Bay by 'freezing' most of the land in the 
vicinity, much of which was appropriated through com-
pensation from farmers and other private groups and 
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individuals, enabling the planners to begin with a 
'clean slate'. 
Map 8. Richards Bay 
Industrialisation began when the Alusaf 
aluminium smelter was established at Richards Bay through 
state enterprise. Production began in 1971, providing 
the main materials for overhead cable manufacturer, 
Alcor, with its plant at the Alton industrial park 
at Richards Bay. Under a twenty-year contract, 
Alusaf buys its alumina from Gove in the Northern 
Territory of Australia. Beside such linkage effects 
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with Alusaf, it is expected by state planners that 
more industries will be attracted to Richards Bay by 
government's growth point concessions to industrialists 
locating there (Daily News.4.2.1971: Financial Mail. 
17.1.1975). 
A major private industrial plant to have 
located at Richards Bay is owned by Triomf Fertilizer 
Investments and produces phosphoric acid. Deliveries 
have already been made to Brazil and a ten-year con-
tract has been negotiated for the supply of 50,000tons 
of phosphoric acid to Japan (South African Digest.18.3.1977)^. 
As previously alluded to, all planning has 
conformed to the principles of apartheid and resident-
ial areas are devised to maintain racial segregation, 
and this by means of a physical barrier. Ezikhaweni, 
the black residential area (designated on the accompanying 
map as reserve nc". 10), lies south west of the bay 
and will provide the bulk of the labour required by 
industries located four or more kilometres across the 
flood plain of the Mhlatuzi river. The area designated 
reserve no. 4, on the other hand, is subject to re-
designation according to the most recently announced 
consolidation plans and will ultimately fall under 
white ownership. 
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At this stage, mention should be made cf a 
coastal mining operation in reserve no. 4, 7km north of 
Richards Bay. The deposit of heavy mineral-bearing 
sand in the coastal dunes will yield an assortment of 
minerals totalling 700megatons by 1980 (Financial 
Mail,30.7.1976)*\ The Bantu Mining Corporation will 
receive 10$ of profits from the operation. The 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, 
Union Corporation, Quebec Iron and Titanium Corporation 
of Canada, and the Old Mutual will share the balance 
of the profits, with the Canadian concern receiving 
3*£ of the total profits (Financial Mail.30.7.197*). 
Canpdian involvement is intensified by the R12C million 
loan put up by 12 Canadian banks toward the R250 million 
project (Financial Mail.30.7.1976). A smelter is 
being constructed outside KwaZulu to serve the mining 
operation and will commence operation in 1978 (Financial 
Mail,30.7.1976). 
Indications are that the largest proportion of 
benefits to be derived from Richards Bay will accrue 
to the private proprietors of industry and commerce, 
to the state, and to foreign investors. Conclusions 
of this kind appear contrary to the ideals of Richards 
Bay's planners as expressed in the following passage: 
'There are Bantu Homelands in the vicinity 
of the Bay, and the area therefore lends itself 
to development in accordance with the Govern-
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ment's policy of Separate Development, 
whereby industrial employment areas are estab-
lished at the interface of White Areas and 
Bantu Homelands, so that White and Black can 
benefit economically from modern technology, 
but can live in their own areas administered 
by themselves in accordance with their own 
culture and customs* (Thorrington-Smith,n.d.). 
Naive or obfuscatory, whichever epithet is 
attached to this rationalisation for the means of 
exploiting Richards Bay, the fact that wealth generated 
by the new city will find its way to the white-owned 
cores of capital concentration within South Africa 
and in foreign economic cores cannot be concealed. 
While the level of social well-being among blacks is 
dependent upon development in the economic cores 
(given the capitalist mode of production), that level 
is also curtailed by the extent to which wealth 
polarises in non-black areas in South Africa or 
outside the country. 
Richards Bay was part of Zululand appropriated 
by white interests during the phase of territorial 
fragmentation at the beginning of this century. The 
interests of state and capital today further alienate 
Richards Bay from the Zulu people. This is evidenced 
in the manner in which the consolidation proposals 
manipulate KwaZulu*s borders to suit forseeable growth 
at Richards Bay, and in the way by which returns to 
119 
capital are channeled to the non-Zulu investors in 
local development. The consolidation proposals clearly 
provide access routes between Richards Bay and the 
Witwatersrand, and also for the excision of reserve no.4. 
The motives for these particular provisions in the 
latest consolidation plans relate directly to the fused 
ideologies of apartheid and capitalism in South Africa. 
5.5 Consolidation and Tongaland 
The Tongaland block of KwaZulu (see Maps No's. 
1 and 3. The block coincides roughly with Ingwavuma 
magisterial district) comprises the north-eastern 
region of Natal, which embraces Tongaland and shares 
some of its border with the states of Swaziland and 
Mocambique. Recently, in compliance with the conditions 
cf the 1936 Bantu Land and Trust Act, this peripheral 
region was designated as one of ten blocks of land 
constituting KwaZulu. More recently still, on 25th 
June 1975, Mocambique achieved independence after 
centuries of domination by metropolitan Portugal. 
The new regime in Mocambique governs in accordance 
with an ideology vigorously antithetical to that of 
the South African government and the border common tc 
both states is thus a distinct barrier in political-
space, separating two incompatible political systems. 
120 
In the interim between the two abovementioned 
manifestations of ideological assiduity, in South Africa 
and in Mozambique, lives were lost in the west of the 
region during inter-clan fighting over rights to domestic 
leadership (Daily News.3.9.1974; Natal Mercury.13.9 & 
4.10.1974; Daily News.4.10.1974 ). Cognisance was taken 
of the dispute by Swaziland officials (one clan mounted 
its offensive from Swaziland after moving there from 
Ingwavuma), and they reiterated their claims to the 
western part of the Ingwavuma district (Daily News.3.9.1974). 
The Tongaland block represents a potential zone of 
conflict. 
The western border of the Tongaland block 
coincides with the Ubombo mountains. In 1868 the Trans-
vaal Republic annexed Swaziland and made claims to land 
as far as the coast. However, in 18*9 the Ubombo range 
was settled upon by Portugal and Transvaal as the 
boundary between the latter republic and Portuguese East 
Africa. Although the Swazis were not party to these 
arrangements affecting their territory, they traditionally 
recognised Swaziland's eastern limits as being closer to 
the coast than are the Ubombo mountains(Matsebula,1972). 
Acting as arbitrator over the contest between 
Portugal and Britain for possession of Delagoa Bay, 
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Marshall MacMahon of France defined the northern border 
of the Tongaland block on 28th March, 1875 (Matsebula,1972). 
One of the ramifications of this decision was that the 
Tonga tribe, who occupy a corridor of land stretching 
along the coast between Delagoa Bay and Lake Sibayi, had 
their historical territory dissected. The Tongas were 
at no time involved in the altercation which spawned 
the 'MacMahon Award'. 
Sambaneland, the part of the Tongaland block-
to the west of the Pongola river, was annexed by 
Britain in 1#95 and added to Zululand (Union of South 
Africa,1955). Tongaland, east of the river, was 
declared a British protectorate in 189* and annexed 
by Britain and added to Zululand in 1897 (Union of 
South Africa,1955). 
If the most recent KwaZulu borders are assumed 
ar, immutable (as well they might be while the National 
Party remains in power), and should KwaZulu opt for 
'independence', the experiences of other African states 
with undemocratic border delimitation, irridentism, 
and resultant conflict become portentuous for the 
citizenry-elect of KwaZulu and to the populace of 
adjacent states. 
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Moreover, the 1936 Act, by which token the National 
Party partitions and allocates land, stipulates the 
precise areal size of the 'homelands'. From this pers-
pective, consolidation of the Tongaland block means 
that territory more appropriately related to the historical 
Zulu domain has been relinquished to white control. 
Of course, the pressures on government by white agri-
culture to place the Josini dam and Makatini flats in 
a part of KwaZulu (or, to fit a part of KwaZulu around 
these) should not be discounted. 
The implications of this legacy are numerous and 
whatever the economic potential of the Tongaland block, 
its design needs to be viewed within the broader con-
text of apartheid: a trade-off situation exists where-
by government attempts to appease protestations by 
white capital and by blacks (within the constraints of 
an obsolete Act), and to maintain social, economic, and 
political dominance. The Tongaland block appears to 
partially satisfy this form of equilibrium while also 
conveniently providing a buffer zone in Southern African 
political space. 
5.6 Summary 
Economic, political, and social dimensions of 
the consolidation proposals and their implementation 
were encountered in this chapter. They indicated an 
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accentuation of disparity in Natal related to core 
ideologies and the two case studies signal a continuing 
state of dependence by blacks upon the local and inter-
national capitalist political economy, whether KwaZulu 
becomes 'independent' or not. 
In the next, final chapter of the dissertation, 
the above conclusions and those from earlier chapters 
are elaborated. 
124 
CHAPTER SIX 
SYNTHESIS 
6.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter the salient findings of 
the research project are presented as a synthetical 
rather than a conclusive set of statements. Firstly, 
the internal colonialism model is briefly recapitulated (6.2) 
and then various significant relationships are drawn. 
State and capital are associated with labour (6.3), and 
with territory (6.4). Land and labour are then con-
nected (6.5) and the question of territoriality and 
the South African internal colony is addressed (6.6). 
Some speculative scenarios of the future place of 
KwaZulu in the structure of development and underdevelop-
ment are sketched (6.7) before a final statement is made 
concerning the spatial impact of state and capital in 
South Africa {^.^). 
6.2 The Nature of Internal Colonialism 
Postulated in the model of internal colonialism 
is a structure of intra-national relationships consequent 
upon certain recognisable socio-economic forms. Essen-
tially, the internal colony is a societal group which 
is subservient to another group which has control 
over power and authority within a given state, and the 
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dichotomy between the two is manifest in the division of 
labour which favours the polarisation of capital among 
the dominant group. There is a tendency toward a 
spatial concentration of the political and eccnonic core 
group, just as there is for the peripheral group, the 
internal colonv. The internal colony may carry the 
additional feature of a distinctive production pattern 
which is inferior in capacity and output to that of 
the wider state economy; a distinction exacerbated by 
the continuing flow of capital into the core regions 
of the space economy in general, and the core societal 
group in particular. Finally, the internal colonialism 
model predicts a confrontation between the internal 
colony and the superordinate group with the internal 
colony seeking independence from the rest of the country. 
6.3 State, Capital, and Labour 
In South Africa, the relationship between 
state and capital revolves about labour, and this on a 
racial basis. 
When the first vestiges of capitalist forms 
appeared in Natal, after British occupation, state and 
capital were indistinguishable in terms of their 
positions vis-a-vis black labour. After all, white 
capitalists, either agriculturalists or merchant land-
owners, were personally involved in government. Blacks 
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resident in the reserves comprised a potential labour 
pool for urban development while blacks endowed with 
the status of tenant or squatter provided a ready source 
of monetary or material income to white land-owners. 
Unable to enlist sufficient and willing local black 
manual labour for an emergent plantation economy, 
capitalists found an cutlet in government's readiness 
to import indentured Indian labourers into the colony. 
Because the implementation of apartheid has 
required stringent control over the location of em-
ployment for blacks, capital has not always responded 
favourably in collusion with anartheid. Apartheid's 
ideologues have of necessity then enacted legislation 
to direct capital into specified areas. Capitalists 
have, as shown by their actions, been unenthusiastic 
about anartheid's regional policies, but only in so 
far as the laws of segregation affect the extraction 
of surplus value from production based on black labour. 
The success of apartheid is deciscively substantiated 
by a capitalist mode of production and government is 
prepared to seek strategies of political and economic 
decentralisation which accord with the demands for 
capital accumulation in the South African and broader 
economic structure of capitalist economy.. Pressure is 
thus being brought to bear on government to adapt 
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segregationist policies to the structure of capitalism. 
Exploitative relationships between capital and 
labour are abetted by apartheid. Capitalism in local 
and international settings thrives on a ready supply of 
cheap labour and in South Africa this situation arises 
directly out of apartheid legislation. Colonial and 
post-colonial government in Natal exhibited a compliance 
with nascent and developing capitalism by tolerating 
a racial division of labour favouring the accumulation 
of capital among whites. Apartheid government has made 
concrete these earlier relationships by legislating for 
a racial and spatial division of labour. 
It would appear that the continuing subjugation 
of black labour is accentuated by the nature of rights 
to territory accorded blacks by the state and associated 
with capitalist penetration of Natal and Zululand 
during the period of colonialism. 
6.4 State. Capital, and Land 
In pursuance of ideologies at the core, gov-
ernment is faced with the dilemma of maintaining and 
increasing economic growth on the one hand, and 
territorially removing blacks from the urban cores and 
primary agricultural areas on the other hand. Economic 
128 
growth is sustained largely by white-owned enterprise 
utilising black labour, and, given a capitalist mode 
of production, the loci of economic growth correspond 
with the areas of most intense capital concentration. 
KwaZulu is constellated about Natal*s most 
economically productive urban and rural zones. The 
precedents of this arrangement are tied with the manner 
in which capitalism was infused into Natal. Initial 
settlement of Natal by trekkers and Britons involved 
the superimposition of private land-ownership over the 
pre-colonial organisation of territory. Reserves 
were set apart as a protective device to ensure partial 
sanctuary for indigenous blacks in Natal Colony. 
Under pressure from whites, government sanctioned the 
penetration of Zululand by capitalist interests. In 
this instance, reserves were demarcated in direct 
response to white agricultural interests which assisted 
in the establishment of the sugar industry in Natal 
(which by then embraced Zululand). 
More recent developments at the hand of the 
apartheid government have included attempts to compact 
the original reserves to afford a basis for the 
envisaged nation state of KwaZulu. Proposals for 
KwaZulu*s partial consolidation have by and large 
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reflected an alignment of governmental decisions with 
the interests of capitalist development in the agri-
cultural and industrial sectors. Borders have been 
delimited to provide maximum possible accessibility 
by blacks in KwaZulu to the industrial centres in Natal. 
Inter-urban transportation routes follow distinct corri-
dors which fragment KwaZulu. Where certain strategic 
resources and planned ireas of urban-industrial develop-
ment have in the past fallen in a reserve, these have 
now been excluded from KwaZulu. 
*.5 Land and Labour 
Black labour in Natal is dispersed throughout the 
province, within and without KwaZulu. Ideally, in 
terms of apartheid ideology, all blacks would ultimately 
be resident in KwaZulu, and would sell their labour in 
the white-owned areas. Blacks within KwaZulu practice 
limited agriculture in the main, and their labour there 
makes little contribution to capital accumulation in 
South Africa. Blacks working outside KwaZulu provide 
the bulk of Natal's workforce, and predominantly as 
manual labourers. The latter group of blacks have 
almost no prospect, under the current regime, of 
acquiring status as permanent residents at or rear 
their place of work, and official policy would have 
them reside within KwaZulu. 
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Rural blacks outside KwaZulu fall into three 
broad categories : those in reserves of the past now 
deproclaimed as parts of KwaZulu; those employed on 
white farms; and tenants on white farms. The first and 
last groups face removal and resettlement within Kwa-
Zulu and members of the other group are considered 
only as temporary workers on white farms. Blacks to 
be resettled are victims of the superimposition of 
a pattern of land-ownership based on monetary values over 
the pre-colonial landscape. 
Besides giving rise to the pattern of land-
ownership which pressures blacks into territory reserved 
for them by whites, the penetration of capitalism into 
Natal has precipitated two 'circuits of production' 
within the province. Although both circuits are 
married into the capitalist mode of production, the 
lower circuit is confined to KwaZulu and represents 
an inferior sector of the economy as far as the generation 
of capital is concerned (cf Santos,1973). For Sachs(197*), 
the lower circuit (which he writes of as 'the traditional 
sector') is, '...in extreme cases' (Sachs,197*:139), in 
fact an internal colony. 
6.6 Internal Colonialism and Territory 
The division of labour on a racial basis is 
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regarded as the fundamental source for internal col-
onialism, and the internal colonialism model adequ°tely 
defines the relationship between blacks in Natal and the 
white-controlled political economy. 
In Natal, all blacks are considered in this study 
to constitute an internal colony, but this clearly on 
a provincial basis. Of course, all blacks in South 
Africa would, in terms of the approach and findings 
of this study, be an internal colony and Natal serves 
only RS an exemplar. 
In South Africa the internal colony is dispersed 
throughout the country and therefore territorially 
almost indistinguishable from the core conscious collect-
ive. The objectives of government in this regard are 
to furnish the internal colony with a territorial base 
and thereafter to 'decolorise' that territory. 
The successful assertion of the internal colony's 
collective crrsciousness by seeking to divorce itself 
from the superordinate group, as predicted by the internal 
colonialism model, would require in South Africa a 
change in socio-economic structures of dependence rather 
than a territorial separation. The 'homelands' do net 
meet the territorial demands of blacks and are merely 
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creations of the core group. 
6.7 Speculative Scenarios 
It is significant, as a form cf evaluation of 
the internal colonialism model, to extrapolate from 
the research findings and theoretical considerations 
and to pose speculations about possible outcomes of 
the current phase of internal colonialism in South 
Africa. Two scenarios are presented below and these 
on the assumption of a continuing white oligarchy in 
South Africa. 
l)KwaZulu remains territorially fragmented and is 
accorded political independence from South Africa in 
terms of apartheid policy. 
Should this eventuate, Zulus would retain their 
identity as an internal colony. The KwaZulu economy 
would remain dependent upon the embracing South African 
economy for at least two reasons. Firstly, migrant 
labour in the urban-industrial cores and white farms 
would still provide the major source of revenue for 
KwaZulu. Secondly, the fragmented nature of KwaZulu 
implies dependency on South Africa for the exercising 
of political rights in KwaZulu, as well as dependency 
in terms of trade and communications outside of South 
Africa. The consolidation proposals do not pretend 
to be aimed at absolute consolidation and for this reason 
there is little possibility for the elimination of 
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internal colonial structures under South Africa's 
government of today. A fragmented KwaZulu compells 
the Zulu people to remain bound into the South African 
political economy. 
2)KwaZulu is consolidated as a single area and is 
accorded political independence in terms of apartheid 
policy. 
In this case, two possible outcomes are postulated. 
a) If the KwaZulu authorities ont for an economic 
system polemically opposed to that functioning in 
South Africa today, it would be necessary for KwaZulu 
to divorce itself from the South African political 
economy to obviate dependence. This would, perforce, 
involve the retraction of KwaZulu citizens from their 
places cf work in South Africa. The magnitude of 
this task and the probable refusal on the part cf the 
workers involved (and South Africa would be reluctant 
to encourage their departure) to carry it out would 
present one problem, while the capacity for KwaZulu 
to absorb them into its economy at once would be another. 
Should the unlikely task be attempted over a long 
period of time, blacks in Natal would remain an 
internal colony until the completion of the task, and 
even then underdevelopment may persist for other reasons, 
such a- P transformation of dependence from a local to 
an international structure. 
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b)If KwaZulu remained within the capitalist structure, 
KwaZulu would remain dependent on South Africa and the 
international capitalist system, just as many ex-
colonies have done (cf Crush,1977 for the case of 
Swaziland). Furthermore, this outcome would bring to 
the surface cleavages among blacks within KwaZulu 
in terms of relative access to capital and for some 
of the main reasons why blacks today are an internal 
colony in South Africa. 
In both of the above instances it wculd appear 
that there is little probability of blacks freeing 
themselves from internal colonialism while the current 
South African political economy is sustained and 
while an assymmetrical interdependence between the 
internal colony and the core exists. This observation 
leads to the suggestion that the period of black internal 
colonialism in South Africa can only end with a changed 
relationship between labour with state and capital. 
This outcome lies outside the notion of 'homeland' 
development. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Internal colonialism in South Africa, as 
exemplified in this study of KwaZulu in Natal, is a 
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function of the combined interests of state and of 
capital. 
Efforts by the state at confining the internal 
colony within specific territorial limits does not 
exempt the internal colony from subservience to or 
dependence upon the core and upon international 
economic structures. 
The solution to the problem of internal colonial-
ism lies not in the relationship between land and 
labour on the terms of coital and state, but in the 
termination of the existing conditions of the 
relationship of labour with capital and state. Only 
then will the problem of territorial rights be able 
to be dealt with effectively in South Africa. 
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NOTES 
PREFACE 
1. Ideology is defined in Chapter One (1.4). 
Discriminate classes are recognised in South African 
society by an expanding social scientific literature, 
although consensus on the issues of isolating 
classes and explaining their structures of inter-
relationship are uncommon in that literature 
(Trapido,1971; Davies,1973; Kuner,1974; Mhlongo, 
1975; Fair and Davies,1976; Johnstone,197*; 
WoIpe,197*; Smith,1977). 
2. Estimates made by the South African Institute of 
Race Relations, 197* yearbook. 
3. This new term followed the 1955 report of the 
Tomlinson Commission. 
4. Apartheid is the Afrikaans term for 'apartness' and 
it is now attached to the segregationist policy cf 
f-e ruling National Party, 
CHAPTER ONE 
1 . cf Thompson (I960). 
2. The term applied to farms bought by blacks in 
colonial Natal, outside the reserves. They remain 
as small fragments cf black territory outside the 
'homelands'. 
3. The de .jure figure would refer to all blacks 
classified by government as Zulu, that is all 
blacks considered by government as citizens of 
KwaZulu whether they live there or not. 
4. The University of Natal (Durban) and Don Africana 
libraries provided most of the data sought. The latter 
is contained within the Durban Municipal Library 
and is a valuable source of historical material on 
Natal, after the Killie Campbell Library in Durban. 
The South African Institute of Race Relations 
Library in Durban is small but contains some interesting 
material on recent history. 
CHAPTER W O 
1. Other recent geographical works of interest are 
the papers by Ginsburg(1973) and Slater(1975) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
1. Descendents of the Dutch who settled at the Cape 
of Good Hope after 1652 and who in the nineteenth 
century left the south western Cape to escape 
British colonial administration. 
2. The Voortrekker government in Natalia Republic. 
3 . This area corresponds roughl}'- with the Alfred 
magisterial district and the portion of the 
Port Shepstone district separating Alfred from the 
coast (Map No. 3). 
4. Fynn, the resident magistrate of Msir.ga district, 
in 1894 commented on conditions in one reserve 
under his jurisdiction : 'More than half this 
surface is mountainous and rocky and cannot be 
cultivated. Water is also scarce, and in dry 
seasons great distances have to be travelled 
to fetch water by the Natives, and the stock 
have to be driven many miles to drink' (Colony 
of Natal,1^94:53). 
5. See Union of South Africa,191* (2): *33-*3*. 
*. The Natal Native Trust held the Deeds of Grant to 
the reserves in Natal during British colonial rule. 
The white trustees were required to '...grant, sell, 
lease or otherwise dispose of the land, in such 
ways as they see fit, for the support, advantage 
of well-being of the said Natives, or for purposes 
connected therewith' (Union of South Africa,1955). 
The Zululand Native Trust took on the same respons-
ibilities and both trusts were put in the charge 
of the Minister of Native Affairs after Union. 
7. The report of the Natal Lands Commission of 1902 
contained the recommendation that '...in the case 
of rural lands, the essential of beneficial occupa-
tion is that a man of European descent should have 
his home on the land, and be bona fide endeavouring 
to make his living thereon. Any owner, of any colour 
or nationality, already registered, will, however, 
have to be regarded as capable of fulfilling 
occupation conditions on his own land' (Colony of 
Natal,1902:12). 
8. Border areas are the officially recognised zones 
adjacent to homelands which satsfy the requirements 
for industrial decentralisation policy and which 
qualify industrialists locating plants there to 
obtain certain stipulated incentive grants. 
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9. Because KwaZulu delayed its acceptance of the 
Legas"1 rtive Assembly status for its Territorial 
Authority, KwaZulu had an Executive Committee 
headed by a Chief Executive Officer. 
If a new Bill to amend the Eantu Homelands Con-
stitution Act is passed, 'homelands' will be able 
to achieve the status of 'internally autonomous 
countries'(South African Digest.8.4.1977). 
10. cf Marks(1970) on the 1906 black rebellion over 
poll tax. 
11. It is interesting to not« that -Seme was the Swaziland 
national attorney who was instructing lawyer for th» 
Swazi delegation which went to London in 1922 
over the question of land partitioning in that country 
(Matsebula,1972). 
12. This applies to the releasing of land from the 
conditions of the 1913 Act for purchase by the 
Native Trusts. 
13. A term widely used to denote non-'homeland' territory 
in South Africa; that is 'white' South Africa. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
1. The ideology of the trans-national corporation is 
concisely stated in a booklet by the chairman of 
Unilever Limited (Unilever,1976 Unilever and economic 
development in the third vorld,Unilever;London). 
2. Maasdorp(1975 * suggests that the figure could be 
as high as a quarter million for illegal blacks 
in Durban while as many as 300,000 blacks in the 
metropolitan area could be shack dwellers. 
3. British financial houses participated in the 
accumulation of finance capital for the plant. 
The plant was planned when phosphoric acid prices 
were high. With a fall in the price, the French 
Gazocean corporation pulled out of the scheme (Economist, 
9.3.1977). 
4. The minerals to be extracted from the mine before 
1980, it is anticipated, will be rutile(56,000tons), 
zircon(115,000tons), titania slag(399,OOCtons), and 
low manganese pig iron(217,00^tons) (Financial Mail. 
30.7.1976). 
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APPENDIX A 
1. Map of 'Multistant proposed by Malherbe(1974) 
and Viljoen(1976) - see p.99 
2. Map showing resettlement villages in Natal. 
Taken from Desmond(1971) - see p.105 
3. Map showing Tonga territory. Taken from 
Junod(1962) - see p.121 
4. Map of Tongaland 188^. Taken from Matsebula(1972) -
see p.122 
5. Map showing selected Natal place-names 
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APPENDIX B 
Comments on land consolidation by the Executive 
Council of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 
Pl.7.197? (Tabled at a special session in January 
-J y I J 4 • 
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COMMENTS ON LAND CONSOLIDATION BY THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE 
KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY : FRIDAY 21ST JULY, 1972. 
TO THE HONOURABLE THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL, MR. P.H. TORLAGE, 
COMMISSIONER-GENERAL FOR THE ZULU AND SWAZI NATIONAL UNITS. 
1. When we met the Honourable the Prime Minister on the 28th 
June, 1971, in the Hon. the Commissioner-General's presence, the 
Chief Executive Councillor speaking on behalf of the Executive 
Council, made it clear to the Hon. the Prime Minister, 
Mr
- B.J. Vorster, that Consolidation of land in KwaZulu on the 
basis of the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act would, if pursued, 
Place us as Leaders of our people in an invidious position. He 
explained that the quota promised by the Hertzog Government in 
1936, was promised as additional land to existing Native Reserves 
long before present policies which envisage the setting up of 
Separate States were ever contemplated. The Chief Executive 
Councillor expressed the feelings of the Executive Council and of the 
majority of the Zulu people when he said that the 1936 land quota cannot 
be accepted as adequate to set up a Separate Country with any possibility 
of viability. In other words we cannot be convinced that the Republican 
Government seriously wants to set us up as a Country, if it can only do 
so on the basis of the 1936 quota promised by the Hertzog Government. 
2. The plan for consolidation as presented to us by Mr. Peppier on 
behalf of the Hon. the Minister, on the 2nd June, 1972, we find it difficult 
to accept, in view of the above views clearly expressed to the Hon. the 
Prime Minister in the presence of both the Hon. the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development and Education, Mr. M.C. Botha, and the 
Commissioner-General for the Zulu and Swazi National Units, Mr. P.H. Torlage. 
That is if we have any say in the matter. It is unacceptable on moral grounds 
as we can hardly accept that what was promised by General Hertzog before 
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Separate Development was ever expounded as a policy, is good enough to 
cover up for any failure to face up to the implications of seriously 
setting up KwaZulu as a Country. 
3. The Zulu people just like other Black people in the Republic still 
expect to get the quota promised under the 1936 Land and Trust Act. They 
can, however, hardly be expected to correlate the fulfillment of those 
promises by the Hertzog Government in 1936 to the consolidation of KwaZulu 
in terms of the present Government's policy under a completely new committment 
of the Country under present policies. 
4. The use of State lands for consolidation seems to be an attempt to 
placate White voters by touching as little of their land as possible. We 
have never doubted in our minds that State lands would automatically fall 
into KwaZulu. It hardly seems fair that hectares from State lands should 
be counted by the Government for the purposes of fulfilling promises under 
the 1936 Land Act or for consolidation under the policy of Separate Develop-
ment. This we state in view of the amount of land that is already owned by 
the White minority in this Country and the little percentage that falls 
under our areas. 
5. The idea of splitting up land under irrigation near Jozini Dam between 
Whites and us left us completely flabbergasted at what appears to us to be 
White avarice gone mad. Whites are already so wealthy in South Africa that 
we would have thought that it would hardly dent White wealth to give all the 
lands under irrigation at Jozini to the Zulu people. We did not expect 
Ubombo and neighbouring areas to be made White merely for the purposes of 
sharing the Jozini Dam Scheme with us, who are starting almost from scratch. 
6. The Game Reserves are an integral part of KwaZulu and just like 
State lands we thought they would automatically fall into KwaZulu where they 
belong. We were shocked to find them split up between Whites (Hluhluwe) 
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and Blacks (Mfolozi), as they are one complex. Since we have no 
industries we thought reserves could contribute towards the alleviation of 
our poverty as a Tourist attraction. We see examples of the great possibilities 
in this respect in the free African Countries like Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zambia. It seems more reasonable to keep Game Reserves as one complex and 
to give them to us as such, instead of destroying them by splitting up 
the complex. 
7. If the Republican Government seriously wanted KwaZulu to be a 
viable State, then Richards Bay should be our port so that we can get 
an outlet to the sea and also give us a possibility of getting anywhere near 
economic viability. We are shocked at the idea of giving all the Coast 
to Whites and leaving us with hardly any beaches. This is more serious 
as it underlies White mistrust of Blacks to the extent of deliberately 
making them land-locked. If we are mistrusted in this way, what reason do 
we have to trust those who display such a mistrust of us? 
8. The scheme involves the removal of too many of our people and 
very few Whites comparatively speaking. This even involves the removal 
of people who have fairly recently been removed to places like Paulpietersburg. 
9. The idea of taking away places like Groutville, Ifafa and others, which 
have developed sugar cane farming, seemed grossly inconsiderate in terms 
of our general underdevelopment as a people. How can our most developed 
farming land be taken away and given to Whites who already have so much? 
10. Stanger is to Zulus a National shrine as it is the resting place 
of King Shaka, the founder of the Zulu Nation. The Afrikaners have their 
own sacred places and this is our most sacred ground and one would have 
expected more sympathy from them in this regard. 
11. The whole idea of having corridors of White territories cutting us 
apart, does not convince us that the Government wants to consolidate 
seriously. This position we find completely unacceptable. 
12. We find it almost ludicrous if it was not so tragic, that all rich 
places that fall logically within a consolidation plan for KwaZulu from 
our point of view should not have fallen within KwaZulu to enable those 
Whites who wish to keep their land and fall under KwaZulu to do so. This 
is not such a horrible idea. We know many dedicated Nationalists who own 
land in Swaziland and Botswana, and who have not turned Black or changed 
their Citizenship except that they must abide by the laws of those Countries. 
13. Even at draft-level, we wish we had been involved as a people 
most affected, to help in making proposals, and a joint Commission of both 
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Whites and Zulus should have been appointed. 
14. To have an ail-White Commission nominated by an all-White Government 
to decide on our future means that it is only the interests of the Whites 
which are well safeguarded. Anyone who contradicts this would only imply 
that Whites are Angels and not Humans like us, if they would not be 
influenced mainly by the interests of their own people. 
15. As far as we are concerned Separate Development is a political 
operation. It is a political solution for South Africa's problems 
Prescribed by the present Government. Therefore, with all due respect 
for considerations as to suitability of land for agriculture and other 
industries, all we are concerned with for the purposes of this policy for the 
moment, is a political map of KwaZulu, and once we have this, it will be 
for us to know what to do once we have a country with clear-cut boundaries. 
16. In view of the foregoing we wish to repeat that the scheme for the 
Consolidation of KwaZulu as presented to us at present, is UNACCEPTABLE TO US. 
We recommend a Natal and KwaZulu Referendum of people of all races on this 
question. 
1. Chief Executive Councillor 
2. Executive Councillor 
(Agriculture and Forestry) 
3. Executive Councillor 
(Roads and Works) 
4. Executive Councillor 
(Community Affairs) 
5. Executive Councillor 
(Education and Culture) 
6. Executive Councillor 
(Justice) 
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NOTION ON CONSOLIDATION 
1. On the 28th June, 1971 the Hon. the Prime Minister told the 
Executive Council that the Republican Government would consolidate 
the Homelands only to the extent of the quota promised under the 
Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936. 
2. On the 2nd June, 1972 the Hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Development, through his messenger Mr. Pepler, released to 
His Majesty the King of the Zulus, the Chief Executive Councillor 
and Members of the Executive Council, a Map of the proposed 
consolidation of Kwa-Zulu. 
3. On the 21st July, 1972 the Executive Councillors presented their 
reactions to the Commissioner General, on the so called proposed 
draft map of Kwa-Zulu, in the form of a memorandum. 
4. On the 19th of October, 1972 the Hon. the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development, met the members of the Executive 
Council of Kwa-Zulu in Pretoria, and attempted to hold 
discussions on the so called proposed draft map of Kwa-Zulu, 
which were not successful. This was on account of the fact that 
the Executive Council's attitude was as follows:-
(a) that the Chief Executive Councillor 
speaking on behalf of the Executive Council 
on the 28th June, 1971 made it clear to the 
Hon. the Prime Minister that consolidation on the 
basis of the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act, was not 
acceptable to the Executive Council as a basis on which 
consolidation in terms of the Government Policy of 
separate development, should take place. 
(b) that the Executive Council had already expressed its 
reaction to the so called draft map of Kwa-Kulu, which 
reaction it presented to the Republican Government through 
the Hon. the Commissioner General on the 21st July, 1972 
in the form of a formal Memorandum. 
151 
(c) In view of the fact that the so called draft map 
of Kwa-Zulu was prepared without any participation of the Zulu 
people, and the fact that it was based on the 1936 Bantu Trust 
and Land Act, which had nothing to do with the Policy of 
Seperate Development, as adumbrated by the Nationalist Government 
since 1948, which basis we do not accept, and also in view of 
the Hon. the Minister's attitude, which left the Kwa-Zulu 
Government without any basis acceptable on both sides, 
I move that in the opinion of this House, that whereas 
we appreciate the willingness of the present Government to deliver 
the full quota of 526 000 morgen promised by the Hertog Government 
in 1936, we cannot accept that such delivery of the said quota 
is sufficient to set up Kwa-Zulu as a country, that being the 
impression the present Government has given not only to us but 
to the whole world. 
Further in view of the Hon. the Prime Minister's 
attitude as set out above, in fixing the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land 
Act quota as the only basis for consolidation of Kwa-Zulu, 
this House sees no point in creating a false impression that 
there is a scope for negotiation, when the Prime Minister's 
attitude makes it so clear that we have no such scope. 
While we accept that we are powerless like all Black people in 
this country, we cannot accept being used to create the 
impression that we have scope for negotiation under these 
circumstances, when in point of fact, there is none at all. 
We therefore wish it known that the proposed 
consolidation on the aforesaid basis is unacceptable to this 
House, and that we bow to it like all unilateral decrees which 
various White minority Government of South Africa have always 
imposed on us when ever it suited them without any prior 
consultation what so ever. 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE COUNCILLOR 
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